Strategic trade in pollution permits

Research output: Research - peer-reviewArticle

Markets for pollution have become a popular regulatory instrument. In this article we investigate the implications of strategic trade in pollution permits. The permit market is developed as a strategic market game, where all firms are allowed to behave strategically and their roles as buyers or sellers of permits are determined endogenously with price-mediated trade. In a second stage, firms transact on a product market and we allow for a variety of market structures. We identify a unique equilibrium in permit exchange, investigate the properties of this equilibrium, and consider the effect of strategic behavior in the product market.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-37
Number of pages37
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Early online date27 May 2017
DOIs
StateE-pub ahead of print - 27 May 2017

    Research areas

  • pollution market, market power, strategic market game
  1. Strategic trade in pollution permits

    Research output: ResearchWorking paper

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