"Working Through the Issues - How Issue Salience and Diversity Condition the Impact of Ideological Disagreement on Coalition Duration."

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Abstract:

Issue salience and diversity direct a range of outcomes such as voting behavior and public policy. Studies, however, have yet to fully integrate theoretical or empirical expectations for the effect of issue salience on coalition stability. By focusing on the mechanism linking parties' preferences to policy-making, I propose that parties with more diverse platforms provide coalitions greater room to negotiate, whereas parties focusing on a small number of issues exacerbate ideological tensions. Issue diversity becomes important once parties exhaust opportunities to make the initial, easy policy compromises. Using evidence from 299 coalitions in 24 European countries, I find that issue diversity in parties' platforms moderates the effect of disagreement. Using a non-proportional hazard analysis, I find that the effect of issue diversity varies over the coalition's lifecycle. Governments with parties willing to negotiate over a larger range of issues decrease the risk that disagreements will result in coalition termination.

Key Words: Issue attention, issue diversity, coalition duration, ideological disagreement, policy change

Issue salience directs a range of political outcomes: parties selectively campaign on issues to attract votes (Petrocik 1996; De Vries and Hobolt 2012), coalition negotiations for ministries depend on parties' preferences for specific topics (Bäck et al. 2011; Falcó-Gimeno 2012; Dandoy 2014), and governments distribute public policies consistent with their expressed issue priorities (Bevan et al. 2011). Parties prioritize important issues by dedicating their resources to them in government. In coalition settings, however, policy negotiations and broad disagreements between parties limit each individual party's ability to unilaterally dictate policy on each issue. Instead, parties must find policy compromises.

Despite evidence of issue salience's importance for a range of outcomes, little theoretical or empirical work explores its implications on coalition stability and duration. Popular accounts of coalition termination, however, emphasize that not only disagreement, but also the salience of an issue matter to the stability of governing coalitions. News reports often explain that coalition governments in Belgium, for example, fall apart due to disagreement on issues of regional autonomy, an extremely salient issue for most parties (for instance, see Traynor 2010).[1] Extending this perspective further, I propose that the distribution of parties' attention to issues in statements of preferences influences coalition stability. Like the Belgian anecdote, I predict that the presence of cabinet parties dedicating the majority of their emphasis to a small number of issues increase the chance that disagreements end the coalition prematurely. In contrast, cabinets that include parties that distribute their attention to a

wider range of issues decrease the risk that disagreement leads to early dissolution; these parties are more open to negotiating policy on a wider range of topics.

I demonstrate support for this perspective by predicting coalition duration using a Cox Proportional Hazards model with data from the *European Representative Democracy Database* for 299 coalition governments in 24 European Democracies from 1945 to 2010 (Andersson et al. 2014). To this data, I add a measure of issue diversity in parties' election campaigns, the Effective Number of Manifesto Issues (ENMI). Like measures used to study issue diversity in public opinion (McCombs and Zhu 1995), election campaigns (Greene 2015), ideological dimensionality (Stoll 2011), attention in parliament (e.g. Bevan et al. 2011; Jennings et al. 2011), or policy change (Boydstun et al. 2015), this variable captures the relative concentration in each party's platform to a small or large number of issues. The results demonstrate that higher levels of ideological disagreement between coalition members increase the risk of termination when coupled parties that emphasize only a small number of issues. Consistent with the theory, coalition parties' ENMI moderates the effect of ideological disagreement. Furthermore, the discovery of non-proportional hazards in the analysis also provides broad evidence in support of the causal mechanism: the effect of the key variables change over time as coalition parties reevaluate the current value of staying in office. This effect is consistent with a story in which coalitions dedicate resources and time to topics that facilitate easy collaboration before shifting to more divisive issues.

These results hold important implications for research on party and coalition behavior as well as our broad conceptions of democratic accountability. Like recent

findings related to manifesto construction and government participation (e.g. Dandoy 2014), these results help connect studies of parliamentary behavior to research on election strategy, policy agendas and coalition negotiations. The evidence is consistent with an explanation in which parties' priorities for policy on issues work in tandem with ideological disagreement to determine a range of outcomes. While the specific issues in parties' platforms may reflect their electoral motivations, the distribution of their attention to these issues in office reflects their attempts to pursue policy consistent with their electoral pledges. Furthermore, the results suggest that policy compromise may be more easily facilitated amongst parties that are not only ideologically close, but also among parties campaigning on a wide range of topics.

Coalitions and Party Preferences

A multitude of factors influence the length of time coalition governments stay together (Laver 2003; Saalfeld 2008).[2] Scholars show that ideological preferences play a key role in explaining coalition duration (e.g. Laver and Shepsle 1996; Tsebelis 2002; Laver 2003; Saalfeld 2008; Maoz and Somer-Topçu 2010). Warwick (1994), for example, shows that the relative preferences of coalition members influence the cabinet's ability to generate policy outputs. Tsebelis (2002) adds that greater ideological distance between partisan veto players limits the coalition's ability to produce policy changes. Broadly, these theories predict that ideologically diverse coalitions have a limited range of policies on which they can agree to develop policies. These coalitions end earlier than

ideologically compact coalitions because they will have difficulty responding to changing world events.

Party preferences also influence cabinet stability by impacting parties' alternate coalition options. Ideologically connected coalitions - those where all parties represented in parliament holding preferences falling between the most ideologically extreme coalition partners are included - increase coalition stability because few possible alternative coalition configurations would be more preferred by coalition parties (de Swaan 1973; Warwick 1979, 1992, and 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999). The relative location of parties' preferences also matters. Moderate or 'centrist' parties increase cabinets' stability (Van Roozendaal 1997). Laver and Shepsle (1996) add that the participation of parties that hold the median seat on the primary dimensions of conflict in parliament (and the corresponding cabinet portfolios) increase the coalition's stability. These parties gain little benefit from alternate coalition arrangements. Alternatively, some evidence indicates that ideologically central parties may increase the likelihood of failure because they possess greater options for different coalition partners and make fewer policy plans in advance (Maoz and Somer-Topçu 2010).

Altogether, these studies find that preferences play an important role in coalition duration. An underlying theme in this research shows that preferences limit parties' options for alternate coalition configurations or constrain coalitions' abilities to negotiate policy compromises. Despite these advances, few studies consider the combined influence of party preferences and issue salience for coalition behavior.

However, research on coalition formation and policy change highlights the role of issue salience. There is evidence that both issue priorities and preferences influence government formation and behavior. Coalition negotiations, for instance, take longer between more ideologically distant parties (Martin and Vanberg 2003). Future cabinet parties prioritize salient issues in their negotiations for cabinet portfolios (Bäck et al. 2011). Ideologically divisive coalitions often face delegation problems when issues become salient, although parliamentary rules provide governments with the tools to overcome many disagreements (Martin and Vanberg 2005, 2011 and 2014). For example, coalition parties appoint oversight "watchdog" junior ministers to portfolios with jurisdictions covering salient issues to monitor their coalition partners. Issue salience is particularly important for ministers from ideologically distant parties (Thies 2001; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene and Jensen 2014). Parties are less likely to engage in oversight activities on portfolios, however, when the issue is tangential to their own issue priorities (Falcó-Gimeno 2014). More broadly, principal-agent perspectives show that policies often represent a compromise between coalition parties' preferences and priorities (Martin and Vanberg 2011 and 2014).

There is evidence that ideological disagreement and issue salience in coalition settings hold further consequences for government policies. Parties' issue priorities, for example, often lead to changes in policy (see for example, Hibbs 1977; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Bevan et al. 2011; Bevan and Greene 2015). Bevan et al. (2011) show that the distribution of issues within parties' agenda leads to consistent policy changes, although world events and economic conditions

constrain governments' ability to focus solely on partisan goals (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Research from a veto player perspective adds that the relative distance between parties limits the range of potential changes to status quo policies (Tsebelis 2002).

Altogether, studies of coalition behavior, party preferences and issue salience illustrate a complex relationship. Like this research, I propose that issue salience and disagreement jointly constrain parties' abilities to govern effectively. Coalitions incapable of maintaining and developing broad compromises due to disagreements on *salient* issues end prematurely. Governments prepared to negotiate their resources on a wide range of issues can last longer in the face of disagreement.

Hypotheses on the Consequences of Issue Diversity and Party Preferences

In this section, I outline the logic for hypotheses linking issue diversity and policy disagreement to coalition duration. I propose that coalitions composed of parties willing to compromise on a greater diversity of issues will be more stable than coalitions containing parties compromising on a narrower range of topics. Issue diversity and salience moderate the effect ideological disagreements have on coalition parties' ability to negotiate policy compromise. Coalitions unable to respond to policy demands on important issues will be forced to end sooner than more flexible coalitions able to pursue policy change on a diverse set of issues. Consequently, the effect of issue diversity will be greatest later in the coalition's term.

Issue salience and diversity are important for policy change and coalition stability because they indicate the breadth of parties' policy goals and motivation to develop policies. Following from electoral accountability and issue attention perspectives, parties in a coalition government will be unwilling to consider policy compromises on issues they excluded from their election campaigns. Addressing these issues will make the parties appear unaccountable for the issues they emphasized in their election campaigns (e.g. Downs 1957; Carey 2008; Kam 2008).[3] Furthermore, the issues parties did not include in their campaigns are likely those that coalition parties sought to avoid in the last election due to their historic policy reputations, the rise of issue focused competitors, or because they hold relatively unpopular positions on those issues (e.g. Petrocik 1996; Meguid 2005, 2008; de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Greene 2015).

Past research indicates that focused attention on issues guides parties' behavior in government. Parties gain cabinet portfolios consistent with their most salient issues (e.g. Bäck et al. 2011), use oversight mechanisms on portfolios containing salient issues controlled by their coalition partners (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene and Jensen 2014), and even implement policies relating to their most salient issues (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Bevan et al. 2011). The logic follows that an overly narrow issue focus ties the hands of parties if they intend to foster an image of accountability.

Instead, parties that distribute their attention to a wide range of topics are likely freer to develop policies in the face of ideological disagreement. From this perspective, parties campaign broadly across issues to attract support, but avoid perceptions of incompetence or a lack of accountability. Disagreements over any single issue become

less important, as coalition parties have more discretion to develop policies across a range of topics.[4] Furthermore, by spreading attention across numerous issues, parties' positions on individual issues likely become ambiguous or blurred (e.g. Shepsle 1972; Rovny 2012, 2013; Somer-Topcu 2014; Greene 2015).[5] Log rolls or policy trades on relatively unimportant issues they addressed in their platforms become possible because the parties do not fear appearing unaccountable.

Issue salience also plays an important role in contexts with little disagreement. When cabinet preferences are relatively close, parties allow greater discretion to their coalition partners. The risk of policy disagreements on an issue decreases when parties hold similar preferences. Coalition parties, for example, are less likely to engage in policy oversight using tools such as junior ministers to monitor ideologically close coalition partners (Thies 2001; Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene and Jensen 2014). More broadly, legislative involvement in the implementation of policies increases along with the degree of conflict between the minister and coalition parties to reduce the likelihood of ministerial drift (Franchino and Høyland 2009). Parties receive cabinet portfolios (Bäck et al. 2011) and use junior ministers on the issues most salient to them (Greene and Jensen 2014). Because they dedicate greater relative attention to those issues, parties that only emphasize a small number of issues in an otherwise ideological cohesive coalition, therefore, likely earn more policy discretion on these issues.[6] From this perspective, ideologically close parties allow each other discretion to oversee the policy implementation of their most salient issues.

The effect of disagreement will be strongest on issues that the partners hold most salient. Ideological disagreement decreases the range of acceptable changes to the status quo (Tsebelis 2002). Parties overly focused on a small number of issues signal their unwillingness to negotiate or compromise on policies addressing those topics because.[7] To these parties, deviation from their limited set of salient issues redirects time and resources to issues other than those on which they campaigned. Attention to issues they excluded from their platforms increases the risk of appearing unaccountable and unfocused on their policy priorities. Given parliaments' limited resources (e.g. Döring 2003), parties avoid attaching resources to issues they hold unimportant, particularly if the policy change would require greater compromise away from the party' position on that issue.

Although coalitions will likely develop agreements on which issues they will compromise prior to forming a coalition (e.g. Golder 2006; Bäck et al. 2011; Eichorst 2014; Greene and Jensen 2014; Ibenskas 2015), exogenous events cause other issues to become important. For example, changing economic conditions and world events necessitate that responsive cabinets address unforeseen topics (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). The regular use of control mechanisms in coalition settings, such as junior ministers or parliamentary scrutiny, to monitor and oversee policies in coalition governance may even exacerbate policy-making tensions as ministers lack the discretion and flexibility to unilaterally determine policy (e.g. Saalfeld 2000; Martin and Vanberg 2011).[8] Like previous studies of coalition duration (e.g. Warwick 1994), I

assume that coalitions failing to deliver policies in response to unforeseen changes will terminate prematurely.

Altogether, I argue that the relative salience of issues in coalition parties' agendas moderates the effect of disagreement on government survival. Coalition parties emphasizing a large range of issues can work together more easily in the context of high disagreement, but coalitions of parties with strong emphasis on a small number of issues will be unwilling to negotiate policies in the face of large disagreements. At lower levels of disagreement, issue salience becomes less important as parties allow greater discretion to ministers or deliberate on policies broadly in advance. This logic leads to the first hypothesis.

H1: Coalitions containing parties with a larger diversity of issues in their platforms reduce the effect of ideological disagreement, increasing the coalition's duration.

Policy compromise links the breadth and salience of parties' agendas to coalition duration. Coalitions consisting of parties incapable of collaborating and responding to world events will end prematurely (e.g. Warwick 1994). Policy disagreements, however, take on different importance throughout the coalition's term in office. For example, the inability to agree on policy compromise might be less important immediately before a constitutionally mandated election than immediately following the coalition's formation (see, for example, Strøm and Swindle 2002). Studies of parliamentary behavior and policy often emphasize a link between parliamentary behavior, policy and

the timing of elections (Huber 1996; Döring 2003; Smith 2003; Bevan and Greene 2015). For example, coalitions work through easy policy compromises early in the legislative cycle before turning to more difficult policy areas (Martin and Vanberg 2008). Likewise, governments are more likely to use parliamentary procedures to contrast individual MPs' differences with their own leadership leading up to elections (Huber 1996).

Connecting this research to coalition behavior, I hypothesize that issue salience and disagreement will take on greater importance later in the legislative cycle. Policies agreed upon in coalition negotiations require time for governments to implement. Coalitions will need to develop solutions to large ideological disagreements prior to forming a government (Maoz and Somer-Topçu 2010). The benefits to staying involved in a coalition government also decrease as new constitutionally mandated elections approach. Disagreements, therefore, become more important as the value of staying in office decreases and unanticipated issues arise later in the coalition cycle.

This perspective implies that the effect of issue salience is not immediate. Being capable of compromising on a wide range of issues only becomes important once the initially agreed upon policies are implemented or new, unexpected policy demands are placed on the government. Based on this logic, I predict that the moderating effect of issue diversity will only become important later in the legislative cycle (once initial compromises have been completed).

H2: The moderating effect of issue diversity will be stronger later in the legislative cycle (as the next constitutionally mandated election nears).

Data and Methods

I operationalize the dependent variable as the coalition's number of days in office before it terminates into a new coalition that contains a different set of parties or an election is held. Similar to Saalfeld (2008) and Deirmeier and Stevenson (1999), I analyze the joint risk of coalition terminations in a competing risk framework to test for the alternate logics leading to each type of failure: a new cabinet or a new election.[9] For the combined risk, I pool together all failures and right-censor terminations occurring for technical reasons such as the death of the prime minister or to regularly scheduled elections. The data on coalition duration and composition comes from the *European Representative Democracy Data Archive* (ERDDA) (Andersson et al. 2014).[10] I only include coalition governments or those cabinets containing more than one party according to the ERDDA because the hypotheses do not directly predict the ability of a single-party government to maintain parliamentary support. The resulting sample includes 299 coalition governments in 24 European Democracies from 1945-2010.[11] On average, coalitions last approximately 737 days with a standard deviation of 518 days. Descriptive statistics for the dependent and primary independent variables are presented in Table 1.

While a substantial literature discusses the measurement of government survival as a dependent variable, the operationalization of salience and breadth, namely issue diversity, of issues in parties' agendas is less clear. However, public policy and media

scholars have long been interested in studying the size of the government or media policy agenda (see, for example, McCombs and Zhu 1995; John and Jennings 2010; Jennings et al. 2011; Boydstun et al. 2014). Like these scholars I convert a measure of entropy, Shannon's H, to a measure of diversity (see the Appendix) to characterize both the overall number of topics and their relative salience in parties' platforms using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens 2015). In particular, I measure the effective number of issues in parties' platforms (ENMI).[12] For the main analysis, I aggregate this variable to the coalition level by finding the average coalition ENMI. I refer to this variable as C-ENMI or the coalition's average ENMI. [13] Figure 1 presents C-ENMI over the course of the sample with selective country labels. Like individual parties' ENMI (e.g. Greene 2015), there is an upward trend overall, as parties and consequently cabinets now discuss more issues in the past.[14] See the Appendix for additional discussion of the primary independent variable.

<<<Figure 1 HERE>>>

Using the coalition's average ENMI as a general measure of their priority for detailed policy goals or collaboration on a larger number of issues, I then create an interaction between the C-ENMI and the level of ideological disagreement in the coalition.[15] I measure ideological disagreement as the distance between the coalition's most extreme parties using Lowe et al.'s log scale (Lowe et al. 2011).[16] I operationalize coalition disagreement as the absolute value of this difference. Larger values indicate greater disagreement, whereas smaller values indicate a more ideologically cohesive coalition.

In addition to the primary independent variables included in this analysis, I account for a number of theoretically important variables to control for the coalition's initial bargaining conditions. I control for the coalition type using dummy variables for minimum winning coalitions and surplus majority coalitions as measures from the ERDDA. Both types of coalitions likely last longer than the alternative: a minority coalition. I include a measure of ideologically connected coalitions using the measure from the ERDDA. The variable equals one when all the parties in parliament that hold preferences on the primary dimension of conflict within the range of the most extreme coalition parties are members of the coalition (e.g. Warwick 1979; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999). In addition, I include a dummy variable that is equal to one if the coalition includes a party holding the median position on the most important and second most important ideological dimensions as measured by the ERDDA. Dimension by dimension median parties may increase the risk of termination as they potentially have a larger number of ideologically close coalition partners.[17] To control for the relative preferences of the greater legislative body and the potential for alternative coalition partners (Maoz and Somer-Topçu 2010), I measure the amount of polarization in the larger legislative body. I measure polarization as the difference between the left-right positions of the most extreme parties in the legislature using Lowe et al.'s (2011) logged left-right scale.

I also control for institutional factors by including dummy variables for whether there is a powerful upper house in a parliament, if the government requires an absolute majority confidence vote or a constructive vote of confidence, and whether there is a

popularly elected president who can disband the cabinet (Müller and Strøm 1999 and 2003; Saalfeld 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009 and Elgie 2011). I include a variable counting the days to the next mandatory election to account for differences in the Constitutional inter-election period (e.g. Lupia and Strøm 1995). Finally, I control for electoral conditions at the end of the coalition by including the inflation and unemployment from the ERDDA. Positive inflation and low unemployment both increase the risk of an early election as coalition parties expect voters to reward them for the economy (Saalfeld 2008 and 2013). I run the models with and without economic variables because these data are limited for earlier periods.

Following from methodological advancements in the study of coalitions, I test the primary hypotheses using an event-history framework. Event-history models are more appropriate for longitudinal and comparative analysis than traditional cross-sectional time series regression techniques because event history analysis directly models the effect of the important variables on time in an essentially comparative framework rather than seeking to limit the impact of time on the analysis (King et al. 1990; Warwick 1992; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Saalfeld 2008). Like Saalfeld (2008), I adopt Diermeier and Stevenson's (1999) approach to estimating cabinet termination from a competing risks framework. This entails estimating three separate models of cabinet termination that account for right censoring in the dependent variable to analyze specific subsets of termination hazards (all terminations, replacement coalitions and early elections). In addition, I account for right censoring in the data from a number of different sources unrelated to my theoretical

perspective including terminations (the death of the Prime Minister or a regularly scheduled election). In the replacement and early election models, the estimates predict the risk of termination for coalitions that are replaced by new coalitions versus coalitions that end in elections prior to the final constitutionally mandated date. I cluster the standard errors for all cabinets that follow an election to account for heterogeneity caused by the inclusion of multiple coalitions following the same election.[18]

Finally, the theory expects a violation in a key assumption inherent to most event history models, the proportional hazards assumption; I predict that the moderating effect of C-ENMI will change depending on the value of the dependent variable. Like previous analyses using non-proportional hazard (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Licht 2011), I include an interaction of the theoretically offending variables with the natural log of time.[19] This specification allows me to directly test whether the moderating effect of C-ENMI becomes more important later in a coalition's term in office. I present the results from the primary analyses in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4. In each table, I first show the results of a simple analysis with only the key independent variables and the interaction with the log of time,[20] before presenting two sets of models without the time interaction and two models accounting for the non-proportionality.

Results

The results from the Cox hazards model in each table provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1; the coefficient for C-ENMI and its interaction with ideological disagreement is negative in the models that do not include the interaction of time.

Coalitions with larger coalition C-ENMI reduce the risk of failure caused by ideological disagreement. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level for the combined risk and replacement risk models. The coefficients are in the correct direction in the election risk models, but not significantly different from zero.

<<<TABLE 2 HERE>>>

To show this effect for replacement cabinets, Figure 2 predicts the hazard rate for cabinets at risk of replacement at high levels of disagreement (one standard deviation above the mean) for two levels of C-ENMI (one standard deviation below and above the mean level of C-ENMI).[21] For coalitions above the mean level of disagreement, C-ENMI decreases the risk of a new coalition caused by ideological disagreement. C-ENMI provides a stabilizing impact as predicted by Hypothesis 1.

<<<FIGURE 2 HERE>>>

In general, the results for the combined risk and replacement risk of termination support the first hypothesis. The results for cabinets ending in new elections are inconsistent with the first hypothesis in Table 4. The second hypothesis, however, predicts a more complicated relationship. The estimated coefficients are likely biased if the proportional hazards assumption is violated.

Empirically, a test of the residuals based in each of the models testing only the first hypothesis provide some evidence of a more complicated relationship. In contrast to many studies of government duration, [22] a test of the proportional hazards assumption using the Schoenfeld residuals indicates that the estimates in many of the models fail global tests of proportionality.[23] Stated differently, the effect of one or more

independent variables relative to the baseline hazard rate of coalition termination is not consistent across the length of observed coalitions.

<<<TABLE 3 HERE>>>

This non-proportionality may explain the inconsistent effect of ideological disagreement and ENMI for new elections in Table 4. To directly test the hypotheses in the non-proportional framework, I re-estimate the models, but allow the moderating effect of C-ENMI on ideological disagreement to change over time using.[24]

The results from the non-proportional analysis demonstrate clearer support for the second hypothesis for all non-proportional models.[25] Consistent with the theory, the coefficients indicate that the effect of C-ENMI is non-proportional, although the coefficients for the interaction of coalition mean ENMI and disagreement (not interacted with time) are in the wrong direction. These coefficients imply that on the first day of the coalition, disagreement and C-ENMI together increase the risk of early termination. However, coalition ENMI and its interaction of disagreement when interacted with time are negative and statistically different from zero for each type of coalition termination. This suggests that the long term effect of both coalition C-ENMI and the interaction stabilizes the coalition, although it might initially increase the risk of termination.

Given the large number of interactions, the combined effect of C-ENMI in each of the models is difficult to interpret using coefficients alone (Licht 2011). To demonstrate the non-proportional impact of C-ENMI and ideological disagreement, I present the first difference percentage change in the baseline hazard rate for cabinets at risk of replacement and new elections in Figure 3 and Figure 4 for coalitions at low

disagreement and high disagreement (one standard deviation below and above the mean).[26]

<<< FIGURE 3 HERE>>>

Figure 3 and Figure 4 show support for the second hypothesis. In both figures, the results greatly differ according to the degree of ideological disagreement. Indeed, the moderating effect of ENMI actually increases the risk of termination at low levels of disagreement. For higher levels of disagreement, however, ENMI decreases the effect of disagreement later in the coalition's lifecycle. Consistent with a moderating effect of ENMI (as predicted by H2), immediately following the formation of a new cabinet C-ENMI actually increases the risk of a cabinet being replaced in the first years of a coalition. This effect is significant for the first year of the cabinet.[27] However, the effect of C-ENMI decreases and eventually changes to become a stabilizing force. C-ENMI decreases the risk of termination after the coalition has lasted for approximately two years, although the exact point the effect switches depends on the level of disagreement. By around the end of the third year of a coalition with disagreement at one standard deviation above the mean, C-ENMI reduces the risk of a replacement cabinet relative and early elections relative to the baseline hazard by just over 50%. Broadly, this finding is consistent with the explanation that C-ENMI reduces the effect of ideological disagreement once easy policy compromises have been reached for the risk of both replacement cabinets and early elections.

<<<FIGURE 4 HERE>>>

Finally, the controls generally perform as the previous literature expects in Table 2 and Table 3. Many of these variables also exhibit previously unexplored non-proportional effects for the risk of new elections. Surplus majority coalitions increase the risk of replacement in some models, but decrease the risk of new elections. Minimum winning coalitions generally are at a decreased risk of termination. Ideologically connected coalitions have no statistically significant effect. Requirements for an absolute majority of parliament or constructive confidence rules generally do not impact the coalition's tenure. Institutions such as presidentialism and bicameralism increase the risk of termination in the combined models, only bicameralism consistently shows a statistically significant effect in the competing risks analysis. These coefficients likely imply that alternate veto points that can delay or block legislation likely decrease governments' ability to implement policy (e.g. Strøm and Swindle 2002). Lack of concurrent majorities for coalitions in bicameral countries may also limit the ability to negotiate policy compromises (e.g. Druckman and Thies 2002). The coefficients for coalitions that include parties at the parliament's dimension-by-dimension median ideological position generally decrease the risk of termination, but are not statistically different from zero; this might indicate that other measures of ideology better capture parties' outside options. As Maoz and Somer-Topçu (2010) may have predicted, parliaments with larger ideological ranges generally have a slightly decreased risk of being replaced, but the effect is not statistically significant for the risk of new elections. Coalitions with longer constitutionally mandated inter-election periods or days until the next mandatory election face a reduced risk of both forms of termination as Lupia

and Strøm (1995) would predict. Finally, the coefficients for inflation and unemployment are statistically significant in most of the models, although inflation has a more consistent effect across specifications.

Discussion

The theory presented here seeks to directly consider the relationship and identify the mechanism connecting ideological disagreement, issue salience and coalition behavior over time. Provided that electoral platforms reflect a balance of the party's policy and electoral goals, issue diversity in party platforms provide a window into the party's relative priority for detailed policy goals or a broader willingness to negotiate their policy goals on a large number of issues. Parties with a large number of issues stabilize ideologically contentious coalitions through their willingness to work on a range of topics once the initial easy policy agreements have been completed. Coalitions of ideologically distant parties have a chance at long term survival if the parties are willing to work on a range of issues to stay in office. However, parties that only prioritize a small number of issues, such as language and regional issues in Belgium, exacerbate ideological tensions once the coalition accounts for its initial compromises. Parties with greater issue diversity mitigate ideological tensions. The Belgian five party-cabinet led by Martens in 1988, for example, faced high levels of disagreement, but was likely stabilized by comparably high levels of C-ENMI.[28] Based on this perspective, a coalition government designed to maximize stability with high levels of ideological

disagreement would include coalition parties that campaign on a large diversity of issues.

This article tests the theory using an event history analysis of coalition duration in 24 European Democracies using a new measure from party manifestos, the coalition mean ENMI. Using both proportional and non-proportional hazards competing risk analysis, I show that issue diversity in party platforms mediates the relationship between ideological disagreement and coalition duration. C-ENMI moderates the extent to which ideological disagreement increases the risk that a coalition will break up. Second, I perform a thorough test of the theory using a non-proportional hazards analysis for coalitions at risk of new elections. I demonstrate that parties with more comprehensive platforms significantly decrease the risk of breaking up later in the coalition's term. Ideologically diverse coalitions may initially increase the risk of a replacement cabinet or new election, but stabilize cabinets in the long term. These results are robust to a range of modeling choices as presented in the Appendix.

The empirical tests confirm a theoretical and methodological explanation for the weak findings connecting disagreement to coalition duration (Warwick 1994; Tsebelis 2002; Saalfeld 2008). The analyses are consistent with the explanation that the inability to negotiate policy leads coalitions to terminate early. Each additional issue parties include in their platforms may provide coalition partners with greater room to negotiate policy compromises and engage in log rolls. Parties that include substantial detail on a small number of issues may view compromise as too far outside their range of acceptability even if they constitute a relative improvement over the status quo. This

evidence indicates that studies of parliamentary behavior would benefit by incorporating parties' willingness to negotiate across a range of issues. Current models of public policy and parliamentary behavior may under predict the effect of ideological disagreement because they do not incorporate parties' willingness to forego policy details as a bargaining tool.

Finally, by accounting for non-proportional effects, I add that issue diversity can influence parties' strategic decision making at different points in the parliamentary schedule in different ways. Although previous research found limited evidence of non-proportionalities (Warwick 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999), strategic bargaining contexts such as cabinet formation and termination generally face competing strategies that change over time as legislation and other factors influence the payoffs from bargaining (Licht 2011). The results here indicate that ideological disagreements leading to coalition termination arise within the first one to two years following a coalition's formation. This links well with Martin and Vanberg's (2008) contention that easy agreements are dealt with quickly in coalition settings. However, the finding that higher levels of ENMI decrease the risk of early election terminations towards the end of the coalition's potential duration may indicate that they are more strategic about the timing of the next election than parties with fewer issues (Strøm and Swindle 2002; Smith 2003). Strategic bargaining contexts likely require accounting for non-proportional effects at both the theoretical and empirical stages. These results connect to other recent perspectives such as Druckman's (2008) call for dynamic studies of coalition behavior

by suggesting a more dynamic approach to studying coalitions from a temporal perspective.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Count
Duration in Days	737	518	11	1935	299
Ideological Disagreement	.488	.356	0	1.73	299
ENMI	17.1	4.4	5.5	26.3	299
Surplus Majority Coalition	.298	.458	0	1	299
Minimum Winning Coalition	.475	.5	0	1	299
Ideol. Connected Coalition	.522	.5	0	1	299
Dimension By Dimension Median	.308	.462	0	1	299
Parliamentary Range	1.11	.526	.0919	3.03	299
Presidentialism	.144	.351	0	1	299
Bicameralism	.181	.385	0	1	299
Abs. Majority Confidence	.197	.399	0	1	299
Constructive Confidence	.147	.355	0	1	299
Unemployment Rate	6.88	4.24	.1	19.6	267
Inflation	10.1	23.4	-3	210	287
Days to next election	1228	418	39	1935	299

Table 2. Cox Hazards Analysis of the Combined Risk of Coalition Termination

	(1) Simple	(2) No Econ	(3) Full	(4) No Econ X ln(t)	(5) Full X ln(t)
Ideological	1.301*	2.404***	2.466***	2.774***	2.723***
Disagreement	(0.564)	(0.519)	(0.535)	(0.574)	(0.605)
Ideological	0.629***	-0.121***	-0.135***	0.636***	0.639***
Disagreement X C-ENMI	(0.089)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.073)	(0.077)
Ideological	-0.106***			-0.116***	-0.117***
Disagreement X C-ENMI X ln(t)	(0.011)			(0.010)	(0.010)
C-ENMI	0.008	0.066**	0.081***	0.084**	0.091**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Surplus Majority		-0.592**	-0.578**	-0.831***	-0.804***
Coalition		(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.186)	(0.190)
Minimum Winning		-1.017***	-0.962***	-1.134***	-1.059***
Coalition		(0.175)	(0.182)	(0.171)	(0.188)
Ideol. Connected		0.164	0.148	0.186	0.184
Coalition		(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.137)
Dimension By		0.009	0.045	0.004	0.041
Dimension Median		(0.164)	(0.175)	(0.146)	(0.151)
Parliamentary Range		-0.315*	-0.320*	-0.606***	-0.589***
		(0.138)	(0.143)	(0.146)	(0.157)
Presidentialism		0.627**	0.453+	0.592**	0.367
		(0.210)	(0.241)	(0.214)	(0.255)
Bicameralism		0.657**	0.692***	0.589**	0.602**
		(0.218)	(0.203)	(0.193)	(0.184)
Abs. Majority		0.236	0.326	0.047	0.158
Confidence		(0.197)	(0.224)	(0.201)	(0.227)
Constructive		-0.032	-0.214	-0.094	-0.263
Confidence		(0.175)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.243)
Unemployment Rate			0.047**		0.051**
			(0.015)		(0.016)
Inflation			0.008***		0.005**
			(0.002)		(0.002)
Days to next election		-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
AIC	2329.555	2386.520	2060.424	2200.033	1893.052
BIC	2344.357	2434.626	2114.232	2251.839	1950.448
χ^2	114.350	189.145	185.638	435.760	441.190
Log Likelihood	-1160.777	-1180.260	-1015.212	-1086.016	-930.526
Observations	299	299	267	299	267

Results are from a Cox Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present *p*-values in parentheses. A model including the economic variables and interactions with time do not converge. All significance tests are two tailed: $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3. Cox Hazards Analysis of the Risk of a Replacement Cabinet

	(6) Simple	(7) No Econ	(8) Full	(9) No Econ X ln(t)	(10) Full X ln(t)
Ideological	2.574***	2.843***	3.018***	3.391***	3.628***
Disagreement	(0.743)	(0.717)	(0.801)	(0.960)	(1.028)
Ideological	1.068***	-0.170***	-0.182***	1.090***	1.005***
Disagreement X C-ENMI	(0.245)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.261)	(0.217)
Ideological	-0.185***			-0.191***	-0.181***
Disagreement X C-ENMI X ln(t)	(0.033)			(0.033)	(0.028)
C-ENMI	0.039	0.087*	0.095*	0.116**	0.124**
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Surplus Majority		0.103	0.010	-0.158	-0.275
Coalition		(0.378)	(0.431)	(0.385)	(0.436)
Minimum Winning		-0.852*	-0.933*	-0.770+	-0.906*
Coalition		(0.360)	(0.396)	(0.409)	(0.451)
Ideol. Connected		0.231	0.101	0.250	0.163
Coalition		(0.265)	(0.272)	(0.260)	(0.272)
Dimension By		-0.158	-0.139	-0.288	-0.322
Dimension Median		(0.284)	(0.303)	(0.325)	(0.349)
Parliamentary Range		-0.608*	-0.677*	-1.001**	-1.112**
		(0.297)	(0.321)	(0.359)	(0.378)
Presidentialism		0.666*	0.587	0.662*	0.578
		(0.285)	(0.411)	(0.273)	(0.407)
Bicameralism		0.451	0.610+	0.135	0.389
		(0.327)	(0.352)	(0.410)	(0.380)
Abs. Majority		0.405	0.743+	0.182	0.486
Confidence		(0.339)	(0.382)	(0.372)	(0.427)
Constructive		0.018	-0.333	-0.097	-0.391
Confidence		(0.401)	(0.454)	(0.495)	(0.540)
Unemployment Rate			0.012		0.007
			(0.028)		(0.031)
Inflation			0.011***		0.007*
			(0.003)		(0.003)
Days to next election		0.001*	0.001**	0.001**	0.002***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
AIC	705.207	793.320	671.707	695.574	587.925
BIC	720.009	841.425	725.515	747.381	645.321
χ^2	71.058	57.209	74.396	114.478	123.127
Log Likelihood	-348.604	-383.660	-320.853	-333.787	-277.963
Observations	299	299	267	299	267

Results are from a Cox Non-Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present *p*-values in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed: $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 4. Cox Hazards Analysis of the Risk of a Cabinet Ending in New Elections

	(11) Simple	(12) No Econ	(13) Full	(14) No Econ X ln(t)	(15) Full X ln(t)
Ideological	1.545	2.989^{+}	1.543	3.937*	2.127
Disagreement	(1.299)	(1.732)	(1.736)	(1.726)	(1.845)
Ideological	0.653***	-0.137	-0.083	0.536**	0.550**
Disagreement X C-ENMI	(0.116)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.183)	(0.195)
Ideological	-0.126***			-0.118***	-0.108***
Disagreement X C-ENMI X ln(t)	(0.020)			(0.026)	(0.027)
C-ENMI	-0.002	0.049	0.052	0.055	0.046
	(0.042)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.055)
Surplus Majority		-0.470	-0.732^{+}	-0.538	-0.779^{+}
Coalition		(0.390)	(0.433)	(0.417)	(0.461)
Minimum Winning		-0.771*	-0.675^{+}	-0.919*	-0.791^{+}
Coalition		(0.338)	(0.390)	(0.381)	(0.435)
Ideol. Connected		-0.079	-0.135	-0.066	-0.128
Coalition		(0.268)	(0.325)	(0.311)	(0.378)
Dimension By		-0.411	-0.127	-0.399	-0.086
Dimension Median		(0.348)	(0.382)	(0.369)	(0.392)
Parliamentary Range		-0.129	-0.104	-0.309	-0.314
		(0.249)	(0.271)	(0.300)	(0.341)
Presidentialism		0.257	0.420	0.171	0.262
		(0.404)	(0.402)	(0.372)	(0.414)
Bicameralism		0.856*	0.844*	0.858*	0.765^{+}
		(0.383)	(0.394)	(0.391)	(0.411)
Abs. Majority		-0.061	-0.041	-0.169	-0.210
Confidence		(0.453)	(0.477)	(0.441)	(0.485)
Constructive		-0.042	-0.224	0.018	-0.199
Confidence		(0.317)	(0.342)	(0.327)	(0.395)
Unemployment Rate			0.056		0.060^{+}
			(0.037)		(0.036)
Inflation			0.013**		0.010*
			(0.004)		(0.004)
Days to next election		-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.005***	-0.005***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
AIC	553.332	424.445	378.465	398.071	356.904
BIC	568.134	472.551	432.274	449.877	414.300
χ^2	43.299	120.320	111.250	172.772	207.484
Log Likelihood	-272.666	-199.223	-174.233	-185.035	-162.452
Observations	299	299	267	299	267

Results are from a Cox Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present *p*-values in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed: $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure 1. C-ENMI over time.



Figure 2. Hazard Rates for Multiple Levels of C-ENMI at High Disagreement



Note: The predicted hazard of replacement is for coalitions with one standard deviation below and above the mean ENMI at high levels of disagreement (Mean + one standard deviation). Estimates are based on the results from Model 8.

Figure 3. First Difference Change in the Non Proportional Risk of a Replacement Cabinet from C-ENMI



Figure 4. First Difference Change in the Non Proportional Risk of an Election from C-ENMI



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Online Appendix to "Working through the Issues"

In this Appendix, I provide additional evidence in support of the results presented in "Working through the Issues." In particular, I provide a detailed discussion of the construction and validation of the primary independent variable, the effective number of manifesto issues (ENMI) as well as a series of sensitivity analyses to demonstrate the robustness of the findings presented in the main text. I begin with a discussion of the operationalization of issue diversity.

Measurement Appendix

Researchers have shown increasing interest in concepts of issue salience and diversity. For example, public policy (e.g. Jennings et al. 2011; Boydsten et al. 2014) and party politics scholars (e.g. Nyblade 2004 ; Stoll 2011; Greene 2015) summarize the relative attention to issues in policy outputs and party manifestos using measures of diversity. Diversity indicators begin as a measure of entropy or the concentration of attention to issues on one or a small number of categories. Shannon's H (Shannon 1948) index (Equation 1), for example, measures the extent to which a manifesto concentrates its attention to a small or large number of topics where, m, equals the percentage of the document dedicated to issue, i. Larger values indicate greater concentration to a small number of issues.

Equation 2 converts Shannon's H into a measure of diversity (following Jost 2006; see also Boydsten et al. 2014; Greene 2015). Diversity measures both the concentration

as well as the total number of issues. By inverting the index, issue diversity measures the effective number of issues. As the example presented in Equation 3 demonstrates, the effective number of issues is equal to the total number of categories given attention when each category is given the same amount of attention. When one or a small number of categories are given disproportionate attention, then the value will always be less than the number of categories discussed.

$$Shannon's\ H = -\sum_{i=1}^{42} m_i \ln(m_i) \quad (1)$$

$$Effective\ Number\ of\ Manifesto\ Issues = \exp(Shannon's\ H) \quad (2)$$

As discussed in the main text, there are 42 categories in the Comparative Manifestos Project (once the directional categories are collapsed). This indicates that the highest value of ENMI would be 42 if all issues received the exact same attention. ENMI is lower in any other configuration.

Figure A1. Issue Diversity by Party Family.



I present the aggregate smoothed levels of ENMI by party family across the sample in Figure A1. The figure illustrates that there is an upward trend in ENMI. This trend fits well with studies of issue competition that demonstrate an increase in competition on previously unaddressed issues such as the environment, human rights, or immigration (e.g. Meguid 2005, 2008). Furthermore, the increasing trend fits well with Przeworksi and Sprague's (1986) argument that Social Democratic parties have broadened their appeal to a wider range of issues as they seek to attract new constituencies to the party. More broadly, the parties of the traditional center left and right have seen the steadiest increase, consistent with the catch-all thesis (Kirchheimer 1990).[1]

Figure A2. Issue Diversity in Germany.

[1] For additional applications of this type of measure see Nyblade (2004), Stoll (2011), Greene and Jensen (2014) and Greene (2015).



Although Figure 1A demonstrates interesting trends across party types, it provides little information about how parties in any individual system change. To demonstrate variation at the individual party level, Figure 2A highlights ENMI for the major parties in Germany. Each of the major parties shows substantial shifts over the analysis period. Intriguingly, there is a slight upward trend for all parties, particularly near the end of the time series. The CDU discusses the greatest diversity of issues within the German sample in the late 1970s with an ENMI over 27. According to the theoretical perspective, this suggests that the CDU was quite willing to legislate on a range of issues following that election, but was less willing to collaborate previously in the 1950s and 1960s. Immediately prior to elections in 1998, all parties increased their ENMI, but the SPD did so quite dramatically. This trend suggests that each of the parties would have been capable of collaborating on a range of issues following the 1998 election, potentially reflecting broad office seeking priorities.

Figure A3. ENMI and Party Seat Share/Size



A potential limitation of ENMI is that any variance in the measure might only capture the difference between small and large parties if only small parties adopt manifestos with low levels of diversity. Figure 3 plots parties' ENMI against their seat shares. As Figure A3 demonstrates, this is clearly not the case, despite a positive correlation (Pearson's Correlation Coefficient .08). Smaller parties tend to also discuss a large number of issues even accounting party family. Green parties, for example, on average have an ENMI of over 16.5 in the sample. Small parties also discuss a large range of topics. The difference is rather that small and niche parties often discuss a different set of issues than their more mainstream competitors. Furthermore, even niche parties discuss traditional economic policies in their platforms, although they may not gain the most attention (Spoon 2011; Wagner and Meyer 2014).

Another potential counter argument would be that the average ENMI may be just another proxy measure of disagreement or that average coalition ENMI poorly reflects the distribution of each coalition party's ENMI. In the main analysis, the primary independent variable is the coalition average ENMI, which reflects the average willingness of coalition parties to collaborate on a small or large range of issues. The hypotheses predict that ENMI conditions the effect of ideological disagreement in the coalition. Figure A4 shows the bivariate relationship between average ENMI in a coalition, the party with the lowest ENMI and the party with the highest ENMI with the amount of ideological disagreement in the coalition. Interestingly, both the lowest ENMI and mean ENMI are negatively related to disagreement while a coalition where the party with the highest level of ENMI positively correlates with disagreement. The relationship between mean ENMI and disagreement is negative, but only maintains a weak bivariate relationship. Altogether there is no strong relationship between parties' ENMI and disagreement, although a more detailed analysis is necessary to determine the full relationship between the two measures.

Figure 4A. Correlation of Coalition ENMI and Disagreement



Another concern is that a measure of central tendency, such as the average, unnecessarily throws away information about each party's contribution. An alternative approach is to use information about the coalition partner with the lowest ENMI or the highest ENMI to explain a richer story about coalition negotiations. Figure 5A shows the bivariate relationship between coalition duration and ENMI for the mean level, and the value of ENMI for the coalition parties with the lowest and highest levels. Intriguingly, as the conditional hypothesis might predict, the correlation of ENMI and duration is relatively flat for each measure on its own. While measuring ENMI as both the mean and the party with the lowest are weakly, positively correlated with duration, the party with the highest ENMI is weakly negative. Pearson's correlation coefficients indicate that although the measures are not exact duplicates, they are closely related to the mean level of ENMI. The measures based on the parties with the lowest and highest

ENMI are correlated at .923 and .917 with the average ENMI. These strong correlations indicate that the average is likely a reasonable summary of the coalition's capability to compromise. In the next section, sensitivity analyses confirm that the average succinctly accounts for differences in ENMI for coalition parties.

Figure 5A. Alternate indicators of coalition ENMI.



Sensitivity analysis 1 – Is the Average Coalition ENMI a reasonable approach?

The average coalition ENMI necessarily ignores differences in the variance in the coalition parties' individual values. Alternate approaches might make greater use of the differences in variance between parties by directly including them in the analysis as independent variables. This approach might refocus the analysis by predicting coalition duration at the party level. To demonstrate the consistency of the results, I present the results of sensitivity analyses using alternate measures of coalition ENMI and party-level analyses. Largely, they confirm the results from the analysis using the average

coalition ENMI and indicate that differences in the variance of coalition party ENMI does not provide much additional information to the analysis.

Minimum and Maximum ENMI.

In Table A1, I present the results from a sensitivity analysis which includes two measures of EMMI for the coalition parties with the lowest and highest values for each type of cabinet termination. The results largely mirror those presented in the main analysis. Further analyses including two variables (lowest, mean and highest ENMI) in the same model leads the model to be over-specified. The close correlation between the measures[2] means that the inclusion of all three and their interactions with disagreement introduces serious levels of multicollinearity to the model. One method for accounting for multicollinearity among a series of related measures is to create an index out of the offending measures. The average coalition ENMI (as presented in the main analysis) would be one way to do reduce the collinearity, but still summarize the coalition's broad levels. I present the results of analyses with variables for ENMI of the coalition parties with the lowest ENMI and the highest ENMI.

Table A1 presents the results of the analysis with both the value of the lowest and highest coalition party's ENMI.[3] In particular, the coefficients for the interaction of the minimum coalition ENMI with disagreement are in the predicted direction and

[2] The minimum ENMI has a .89 Pearson's correlation coefficient and maximum ENMI has a .92 coefficient. Maximum and minimum ENMI capture somewhat more distinct information has they are only hold a.68 correlation coefficient.

[3] Alternate models including only the value of the lowest or only the value of the highest ENMI suggest that the lowest ENMI performs slightly better than the highest, but the results are largely parallel to those using the average coalition ENMI.

statistically different from zero at greater than the 90% level in nearly all of the models. In nearly every model, the constitutive terms for the two measures of ENMI are positive and the interactions with ideological disagreement are negative. The coefficients for the maximum coalition ENMI are in the correct direction in most models, but are not statistically different from zero. Interestingly, the coefficients for the interaction of the party with the lowest ENMI indicate that ENMI reduces the risk of termination as disagreement increases. Together these results might imply that the parties willing to negotiate on the smallest number of issues may be the limiting factor in coalition policy-making.

Altogether, these results suggest some evidence in favor of the primary hypothesis that C-ENMI reduces the risk of early termination. This analysis should be considered a difficult test of the theory, as the high level of collinearity between the two indicators of C-ENMI likely inflates the standard errors, making statistical significance unlikely for these variables. Finally, tests of the non-proportionality hypothesis impossible due to the multicollinearity. The inclusion of any interactions with time leads the models to fail to converge for all failure types.

Sensitivity analysis 2. Party level information

Another approach to accounting for the rich information provided by parties' ENMI would be to change the unit of analysis to the party level and to use ideological distance from the coalition mean position instead of the cabinet's ideological range. Although this tactic introduces serious issues of non-independence between the

observations, comparable results at the party level would lend additional support to the use of the cabinet's mean level of ENMI and the theory more broadly. Therefore, I replicate the main analyses in Table A2, Table A3 and Table A4 by changing the unit of analysis to the party level.

Unsurprisingly, the results are nearly identical in each model to those presented in the main analysis. ENMI conditions the effect of ideological disagreement and the coefficients are significant in all of the models with greater than 99.9% confidence.

To a much greater extent than in the main analysis, the Schoenfeld residuals indicate serious violations of the proportional hazards assumption at the party level.[4] In the early elections model, nearly all the coefficients violate the assumption. The results including interactions with the log of time indicate further support for the second hypothesis. Consistent with the main analysis, the stabilizing effect of ENMI does not emerge until later in the parliamentary cycle for both types of termination.

Broad conclusions on the operationalization of ENMI

Altogether, the results using alternate measures of ENMI and the party level analysis both suggest that the results of the main analysis are representative of the broader trend. Mean coalition ENMI reasonably captures the coalition's dynamics. Inclusion of alternate measures needlessly complicates the analysis by creating large

[4] The increased levels of non-proportionality likely reflect issues generated by violating the independence assumption and including party level data as independent variables and coalition level data as the dependent variable.

levels of multicollinearity. Focusing on the party level does not fit well with the structure of the dependent variable and violates the model's independence assumption. Regardless of these compromises, the results indicate broad support for the theory.

Sensitivity Analysis 3 – Frailties

In this section, I include additional robustness checks that follow alternate modeling choices. I first account for country and period effects using shared frailties (random effects) to allow for varying intercepts for coalitions that form following each election before presenting a parametric approach that allows for a more direct test of the hypotheses while including fixed effects for the country and decade.

Election Frailties

I present the results from the Frailty models in Table A5. The inclusion of shared frailties allow for observations that follow a single election to have a distinct intercept similar to random effects in multilevel models. The results from this analysis are consistent with the theory and largely similar to those presented in the main analysis. In particular, the key coefficients for ideological disagreement, C-ENMI and their interaction are in the prediction directions and significant in the joint and replacement models. The coefficients indicate that ideological disagreement increases the risk of a replacement cabinet, but that greater ENMI decreases that risk. The coefficients are not significant for the risk of early elections. Furthermore, the frailty models fail to converge

once interactions with the log of time are included, limiting the ability to directly test the second hypothesis in this framework. These results indicate support for the first hypothesis, but at best inconclusive results for the second hypothesis.

Parametric Models of Coalition Duration with Fixed Effects

While election frailties account for heterogeneity caused by processes linked to cabinets following the same election, the Cox Model is unable to converge with more complex specifications meant to account for variation in space and time. Instead, I replicate these analyses with the parametric Weibull event history model to allow for the inclusion of additional variables to account for country level and temporal effects. In particular, I include fixed effects for both the country and decade levels using the Weibull distribution as the baseline hazard. These results are largely consistent with those assuming an exponential hazard. Models using the gamma distribution faced similar convergence problems.

I present the replication of the main analysis in Table A6 and Table A7. The coefficients mirror those presented in the main analysis. The interaction of C-ENMI and ideological disagreement is negative and statistically significant in the combined risk and replacement risk models in Table A6. These results indicate that ideological disagreement increases the risk of new cabinets, while C-ENMI moderates the chance in risk from disagreement.

To further test the second hypothesis, I rerun the analysis including interactions of the natural log of time with C-ENMI and the interaction of C-ENMI and ideological disagreement in Table A7. Table A7 demonstrates strong evidence for the second hypothesis. Coefficients for each of the interactions with time are negative. The interactions of C-ENMI and the natural log of time are strongly significant in each of the models. This indicates that the initial increased from disagreement is decreased by C-ENMI at later points in the legislative cycle. Given the general increasing risk of termination from the baseline hazard in the Weibull model, the moderating effect of C-ENMI becomes clear once there is a real risk of termination.

Sensitivity Analysis 4 – PDDA sub-sample

Finally, the use of an extensive sample of parliamentary democracies with varying experience with democracy from a range of cultural backgrounds might imply that the results are being driven by the differences between older and newer democracies. Therefore, I re-run the analysis in Table A8 and A9 using only the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (Strøm et al. 2008), which only provides data up to 1999 for Western European Democracies. These results closely mirror to those presented in the main analysis in the text.

In particular, the coefficients for the interaction of C-ENMI[5] and disagreement in Table A8 are negative and statistically significant in the combined and replacement models. The coefficients fail to reach standard levels of significance for the early election

[5] These models use coalition ENMI based on the Herfindahl index rather than Shannons' H (see Greene 2015). The results are substantively similar using either measure.

models. Table A9 presents the results with an interaction of the natural log of time. Like the main analysis, the effect of the key variables are in the correct direction and statistically significant. I present predicted effects from this analysis in Figure 6A based on Licht's (2011) method. Figure 6a demonstrates that C-ENMI decreases the risk of early termination for both types, although the effect is clearest in the replacement models.

Figure6A. First Difference Change in the Non Proportional Risk of an Election from C-ENMI using only the PDDA sample



Conclusions

Altogether the results using alternate operationalizations of ENMI, shared frailties, parametric models with fixed effects or the PDDA subset provide additional evidence in support of the hypotheses. C-ENMI decreases the risk of failure from

ideological disagreement. Furthermore, the non-proportional analyses including interactions with time show that the effect of C-ENMI takes effect later in the parliamentary cycle. Ultimately, however, these tests are limited by the number of observations for each type of failure. Additional observations of coalition failure will better enable future analyses that can fully account for time in a rigorous manner.

Table A1. Cabinet level analysis with multiple measures of ENMI using the Cox Proportional Hazards Model. [6]

	(1) Combined Risk	(2) Combined Risk (Full)	(3) Replacement Risk plus Economy	(4) Replacement Risk (Full)	(5) Election Risk	(6) Election Risk (Full)
Ideological	2.278***	2.416***	2.687***	2.754**	1.493	-0.037
Disagreement	(0.561)	(0.629)	(0.725)	(0.910)	(2.207)	(2.110)
Ideological	-0.096+	-0.094+	-0.131+	-0.161*	-0.186+	-0.166
Disagreement X Min	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.106)	(0.103)
ENMI						
Min ENMI	0.029	0.018	0.010	0.020	0.039	0.013
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Ideological	-0.031	-0.051	-0.051	-0.035	0.089	0.113
Disagreement X Max	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.081)	(0.140)	(0.145)
ENMI						
Max ENMI	0.039	0.069+	0.089+	0.083	-0.012	0.029
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.089)
Surplus Majority	-0.657***	-0.648***	0.037	0.020	-0.580	-0.875*
Coalition	(0.178)	(0.181)	(0.389)	(0.458)	(0.388)	(0.438)
Minimum Winning	-1.034***	-0.981***	-0.783*	-0.856*	-0.774*	-0.634
Coalition	(0.180)	(0.188)	(0.381)	(0.428)	(0.353)	(0.409)
Ideol. Connected	0.170	0.158	0.242	0.132	-0.082	-0.092
Coalition	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.265)	(0.276)	(0.281)	(0.351)
Dimension By	0.023	0.059	-0.151	-0.209	-0.389	-0.132
Dimension Median	(0.164)	(0.172)	(0.295)	(0.331)	(0.364)	(0.410)
Parliamentary Range	-0.288*	-0.278+	-0.527+	-0.622+	-0.097	0.006
	(0.147)	(0.153)	(0.318)	(0.340)	(0.278)	(0.322)
Presidentialism	0.564*	0.357	0.537+	0.382	0.026	0.177
	(0.222)	(0.249)	(0.285)	(0.421)	(0.479)	(0.470)
Bicameralism	0.615**	0.645**	0.409	0.492	0.695	0.689+
	(0.218)	(0.201)	(0.317)	(0.347)	(0.427)	(0.401)
Abs. Majority	0.227	0.348	0.355	0.751+	-0.019	0.192
Confidence	(0.193)	(0.218)	(0.337)	(0.384)	(0.451)	(0.524)
Constructive	-0.035	-0.231	0.067	-0.320	-0.161	-0.465
Confidence	(0.174)	(0.210)	(0.378)	(0.443)	(0.400)	(0.459)
Unemployment Rate		0.051***		0.019		0.077+
		(0.015)		(0.032)		(0.041)
Inflation		0.007***		0.008**		0.015***
		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.004)
Days to next election	-0.002***	-0.002***	0.001*	0.001**	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
AIC	2387.576	2060.556	793.366	672.258	426.113	379.079
BIC	2443.082	2121.539	848.872	733.242	481.620	440.062
χ^2	189.416	183.860	64.514	74.586	148.392	148.024
Log Likelihood	-1178.788	-1013.278	-381.683	-319.129	-198.056	-172.540
Observations	299	267	299	267	299	267

[6] Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A2. Party Level Analysis for Combined Risk of Termination. [7]

	(7) Simple	(8) No Econ	(9) Full	(10) No Econ X ln(t)	(11) Full X ln(t)
Ideological	2.594**	3.261***	3.153***	3.529***	3.201***
Disagreement	(0.794)	(0.694)	(0.711)	(0.776)	(0.837)
Ideological	1.080***	-0.176***	-0.180***	1.103***	1.101***
Disagreement X	(0.142)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.118)	(0.120)
ENMI					
Ideological	-0.190***			-0.196***	-0.194***
Disagreement X	(0.019)			(0.017)	(0.017)
ENMI X ln(t)					
ENMI	0.011	0.038**	0.045**	0.043**	0.046**
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Surplus Majority		-0.571**	-0.594**	-0.709***	-0.720***
Coalition		(0.190)	(0.194)	(0.167)	(0.171)
Minimum Winning		-0.993***	-0.928***	-0.980***	-0.903***
Coalition		(0.170)	(0.175)	(0.151)	(0.161)
Ideol. Connected		0.163	0.138	0.170	0.143
Coalition					
		(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.120)	(0.124)
Dimension By		-0.047	0.003	0.022	0.066
Dimension Median					
		(0.177)	(0.185)	(0.142)	(0.147)
Parliamentary Range		-0.210	-0.229	-0.371**	-0.379**
		(0.152)	(0.159)	(0.131)	(0.138)
Presidentialism		0.587**	0.510*	0.550**	0.450+
		(0.201)	(0.235)	(0.194)	(0.232)
Bicameralism		0.711**	0.745***	0.671***	0.709***
		(0.219)	(0.209)	(0.186)	(0.178)
Abs. Majority		0.145	0.200	-0.022	0.031
Confidence		(0.201)	(0.227)	(0.184)	(0.207)
Constructive		0.025	-0.134	-0.043	-0.163
Confidence		(0.187)	(0.220)	(0.197)	(0.223)
Unemployment Rate			0.034*		0.034*
			(0.015)		(0.015)
Inflation			0.007***		0.006***
			(0.002)		(0.001)
Days to next election		-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
AIC	8196.244	8275.529	7202.804	7871.617	6847.825
BIC	8215.130	8336.908	7271.984	7937.717	6921.618
χ^2	131.495	178.523	176.284	489.534	466.705
Log Likelihood	-4094.122	-4124.765	-3586.402	-3921.809	-3407.913
Observations	830	830	744	830	744

[7] Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A3. Party Level Analysis for Replacement Risk of Termination. [8]

	(12) Simple	(13) No Econ	(14) Full	(15) No Econ X ln(t)	(16) Full X ln(t)
Ideological	4.749***	3.568***	3.736***	5.146***	5.228***
Disagreement	(1.091)	(1.032)	(1.091)	(1.139)	(1.145)
Ideological	1.441***	-0.231**	-0.233**	1.508***	1.470***
Disagreement X	(0.307)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.252)	(0.227)
ENMI					
Ideological	-0.271***			-0.279***	-0.273***
Disagreement X	(0.043)			(0.036)	(0.033)
ENMI X ln(t)					
ENMI	0.032	0.038+	0.042+	0.061**	0.063*
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Surplus Majority		0.210	0.065	0.096	-0.058
Coalition		(0.402)	(0.448)	(0.388)	(0.421)
Minimum Winning		-0.640+	-0.769+	-0.497	-0.656
Coalition		(0.372)	(0.410)	(0.380)	(0.418)
Ideol. Connected		0.329	0.138	0.297	0.140
Coalition		(0.268)	(0.278)	(0.258)	(0.262)
Dimension By		-0.122	-0.102	-0.159	-0.185
Dimension Median		(0.287)	(0.310)	(0.280)	(0.296)
Parliamentary Range		-0.471+	-0.547+	-0.683**	-0.784**
		(0.281)	(0.310)	(0.246)	(0.258)
Presidentialism		0.672*	0.735+	0.633*	0.723+
		(0.289)	(0.395)	(0.258)	(0.372)
Bicameralism		0.464	0.679+	0.408	0.654*
		(0.331)	(0.364)	(0.299)	(0.320)
Abs. Majority		0.239	0.600	0.014	0.337
Confidence		(0.360)	(0.401)	(0.364)	(0.411)
Constructive		0.218	-0.147	0.134	-0.170
Confidence		(0.392)	(0.458)	(0.448)	(0.485)
Unemployment Rate			-0.001		-0.005
			(0.028)		(0.029)
Inflation			0.010***		0.009***
			(0.003)		(0.003)
Days to next election		0.001*	0.001***	0.001**	0.002***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
AIC	2656.993	2800.325	2339.707	2590.615	2157.074
BIC	2675.878	2861.704	2408.887	2656.715	2230.867
χ^2	70.262	52.053	73.261	140.471	166.856
Log Likelihood	-1324.496	-1387.163	-1154.853	-1281.307	-1062.537
Observations	830	830	744	830	744

[8] Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A4. Party Level Analysis for the Risk of New Elections. [9]

	(17) Simple	(18) No Econ	(19) Full	(20) No Econ X ln(t)	(21) Full X ln(t)
Ideological	2.904*	3.936*	2.381	4.856*	2.851
Disagreement	(1.442)	(1.932)	(1.689)	(1.931)	(1.915)
Ideological	1.165***	-0.154	-0.106	0.858**	0.851**
Disagreement X	(0.178)	(0.108)	(0.098)	(0.292)	(0.289)
ENMI					
Ideological	-0.226***			-0.175***	-0.163***
Disagreement X	(0.031)			(0.045)	(0.043)
ENMI X ln(t)					
ENMI	-0.001	0.012	0.022	0.018	0.023
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Surplus Majority		-0.427	-0.679	-0.544	-0.813+
Coalition		(0.391)	(0.459)	(0.375)	(0.442)
Minimum Winning		-0.905*	-0.767+	-0.987**	-0.836*
Coalition		(0.353)	(0.415)	(0.356)	(0.411)
Ideol. Connected		-0.039	-0.062	-0.005	-0.023
Coalition		(0.284)	(0.320)	(0.284)	(0.314)
Dimension By		-0.573+	-0.383	-0.449	-0.234
Dimension Median		(0.335)	(0.371)	(0.329)	(0.358)
Parliamentary Range		-0.103	-0.090	-0.213	-0.233
		(0.247)	(0.263)	(0.244)	(0.277)
Presidentialism		0.241	0.377	0.247	0.383
		(0.401)	(0.479)	(0.381)	(0.444)
Bicameralism		0.823*	0.855*	0.765+	0.778*
		(0.401)	(0.381)	(0.399)	(0.386)
Abs. Majority		-0.180	-0.189	-0.322	-0.351
Confidence		(0.477)	(0.494)	(0.461)	(0.486)
Constructive		-0.077	-0.452	-0.034	-0.437
Confidence		(0.346)	(0.413)	(0.336)	(0.454)
Unemployment Rate			0.045		0.047
			(0.042)		(0.040)
Inflation			0.015***		0.013**
			(0.004)		(0.004)
Days to next election		-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.005***	-0.005***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
AIC	1874.393	1477.187	1294.927	1424.914	1251.927
BIC	1893.279	1538.565	1364.108	1491.014	1325.719
χ^2	59.048	148.137	127.455	241.278	264.232
Log Likelihood	-933.197	-725.593	-632.463	-698.457	-609.963
Observations	830	830	744	830	744

[9] Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A5. Cox Proportional Hazards Analysis with Election Frailty.[10]

	(22) Combined Risk	(23) Combined Risk (Full)	(24) Replacement Risk	(25) ReplacementRisk (Full)	(26) Election Risk	(27) Election Risk (Full)
Ideological	2.456***	2.340**	2.843**	3.018**	2.989	1.543
Disagreement	(0.685)	(0.793)	(0.981)	(1.069)	(1.826)	(1.955)
Ideological	-0.124**	-0.121**	-0.170**	-0.182**	-0.137	-0.083
Disagreement X C-ENMI	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.102)	(0.107)
C-ENMI	0.067*	0.073**	0.087+	0.095*	0.049	0.052
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.053)
Surplus Majority	-0.612**	-0.480*	0.103	0.010	-0.470	-0.732+
Coalition	(0.202)	(0.212)	(0.385)	(0.415)	(0.398)	(0.427)
Minimum Winning	-1.052***	-0.856***	-0.852*	-0.933*	-0.771*	-0.675
Coalition	(0.188)	(0.200)	(0.365)	(0.383)	(0.380)	(0.419)
Ideol. Connected	0.170	0.128	0.231	0.101	-0.079	-0.135
Coalition	(0.136)	(0.147)	(0.246)	(0.264)	(0.294)	(0.338)
Dimension By	0.016	-0.014	-0.158	-0.139	-0.411	-0.127
Dimension Median	(0.155)	(0.169)	(0.284)	(0.306)	(0.356)	(0.394)
Parliamentary Range	-0.326*	-0.284+	-0.608*	-0.677*	-0.129	-0.104
	(0.150)	(0.161)	(0.278)	(0.303)	(0.288)	(0.316)
Presidentialism	0.638**	0.506*	0.666+	0.587	0.257	0.420
	(0.222)	(0.255)	(0.351)	(0.424)	(0.508)	(0.564)
Bicameralism	0.681***	0.635**	0.451	0.610+	0.856*	0.844*
	(0.190)	(0.195)	(0.349)	(0.370)	(0.410)	(0.426)
Abs. Majority	0.243	0.250	0.405	0.743*	-0.061	-0.041
Confidence	(0.202)	(0.211)	(0.338)	(0.369)	(0.482)	(0.545)
Constructive	-0.034	0.004	0.018	-0.333	-0.042	-0.224
Confidence	(0.221)	(0.225)	(0.401)	(0.454)	(0.449)	(0.501)
Unemployment Rate[11]		-0.155*		0.012		0.056
		(0.078)		(0.031)		(0.041)
Inflation		0.274***		0.011**		0.013**
		(0.068)		(0.004)		(0.005)
Days to next election	-0.002***	-0.002***	0.001*	0.001*	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
AIC	2386.436	2002.893	793.319	671.707	424.445	378.465
BIC	2434.542	2056.361	841.425	725.515	472.551	432.274
χ^2	191.154	158.685	40.536	44.327	113.906	100.906
Log Likelihood	-1180.218	-986.447	-383.660	-320.853	-199.223	-174.233
Observations	299	261	299	267	299	267

[10] Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

[11] The unemployment rate and inflation variables caused the joint models to not converge. The results presented in Model 23 use transformed values of these variables, using the inverse of the unemployment rate (1/unemployment rate) and the natural log of inflation. Model 25 and Model 27 use the untransformed values.

Table A6. Parametric Survival Model (Weibull distribution) with country and decade fixed effects. [12]

	(28) Combined Risk	(29) Combined Risk (Full)	(30) Replacement Risk	(31) ReplacementRisk (Full)	(32) Election Risk	(33) Election Risk (Full)
Ideological Disagreement	2.626***	2.552***	4.779***	5.823***	4.489*	0.538
	(0.571)	(0.552)	(1.413)	(1.641)	(2.104)	(2.116)
Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI	-0.126***	-0.131***	-0.278**	-0.336**	-0.206	-0.007
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.094)	(0.107)	(0.132)	(0.160)
C-ENMI	0.098***	0.095**	0.211**	0.200*	0.095	0.052
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.101)
Surplus Majority	-0.928***	-0.816**	-0.296	-0.755	-1.049+	-1.118+
Coalition	(0.268)	(0.256)	(0.696)	(0.707)	(0.556)	(0.576)
Minimum Winning	-1.171***	-1.068***	-1.652*	-2.129**	-1.417*	-0.982
Coalition	(0.223)	(0.240)	(0.686)	(0.753)	(0.687)	(1.002)
Ideol. Connected	0.141	0.079	0.379	0.097	0.152	0.461
Coalition	(0.135)	(0.158)	(0.349)	(0.465)	(0.458)	(0.584)
Dimension By	-0.093	-0.054	-0.571	-0.425	-0.672	-0.212
Dimension Median	(0.192)	(0.203)	(0.431)	(0.466)	(0.520)	(0.802)
Parliamentary Range	-0.430**	-0.413*	-0.802	-0.585	-0.210	-0.850
	(0.160)	(0.169)	(0.530)	(0.537)	(0.498)	(0.791)
Presidentialism	-0.216	-0.239	-1.557	-1.217	-0.636	-0.723
	(0.653)	(0.666)	(1.002)	(1.092)	(0.936)	(1.797)
Bicameralism	-2.681***	-2.541***	-2.392***	-2.852**	-6.368***	-9.029***
	(0.369)	(0.384)	(0.579)	(0.909)	(1.443)	(2.598)
Abs. Majority	-2.773***	-2.945***	0.268	13.279***	-8.270***	-10.083***
Confidence	(0.748)	(0.753)	(1.394)	(1.521)	(1.872)	(2.674)
Constructive	-1.199*	-0.757	-2.312**	-16.162***	-15.162***	-15.491***
Confidence	(0.600)	(0.750)	(0.847)	(1.039)	(1.209)	(1.455)
Unemployment Rate[13]		0.026		-0.036		0.087
		(0.024)		(0.085)		(0.110)
Inflation		0.011***		0.005		0.026***
		(0.002)		(0.006)		(0.007)
Days to next election	-0.002***	-0.002***	0.003*	0.005***	-0.007***	-0.008***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
AIC	609.912	555.756	418.440	349.143	239.217	211.385
BIC	761.631	710.008	581.260	478.013	402.036	372.811
Log Likelihood	-263.956	-234.878	-165.220	-138.571	-75.608	-60.693
Observations	299	267	299	265	299	267

[12] Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

[13] Model 31 for replacement cabinets would not converge when the raw unemployment rate was included. Model 31 in Table A6 presents the results transformed with unemployment rate transformed to one divided by the natural log of the unemployment rate.

Table A7. Parametric Survival Model (Weibull distribution) with country and decade fixed effects and non-proportional effects. [14]

	(34) Combined Risk	(35) Combined Risk (Full)	(36) Replacement Risk	(37) ReplacementRisk (Full)	(38) Election Risk	(39) Election Risk (Full)
Ideological	2.793***	2.768***	6.616***	7.423***	5.014**	1.799
Disagreement	(0.683)	(0.716)	(1.676)	(1.915)	(1.855)	(1.901)
Ideological	0.867***	0.848***	0.966***	1.046***	0.565**	0.746**
Disagreement X C-ENMI	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.131)	(0.171)	(0.213)	(0.249)
Ideological	-0.150***	-0.148***	-0.200***	-0.220***	-0.132***	-0.132***
Disagreement X C-ENMI X ln(time)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.035)
C-ENMI	0.116***	0.105**	0.276***	0.273**	0.107	0.084
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.082)	(0.098)	(0.071)	(0.094)
Surplus Majority	-1.239***	-1.148***	-0.496	-0.566	-1.148*	-1.264*
Coalition	(0.234)	(0.225)	(0.613)	(0.619)	(0.516)	(0.534)
Minimum Winning	-1.178***	-1.067***	-1.673*	-1.859*	-1.298*	-0.943
Coalition	(0.226)	(0.253)	(0.676)	(0.732)	(0.640)	(0.851)
Ideol. Connected	0.006	-0.031	0.320	0.075	-0.062	0.165
Coalition	(0.147)	(0.168)	(0.357)	(0.484)	(0.458)	(0.472)
Dimension By	-0.234	-0.101	-0.881+	-0.597	-0.886+	-0.567
Dimension Median	(0.171)	(0.173)	(0.484)	(0.616)	(0.476)	(0.556)
Parliamentary Range	-0.644***	-0.642***	-1.604*	-1.129+	-0.633	-1.277
	(0.172)	(0.188)	(0.671)	(0.656)	(0.629)	(0.892)
Presidentialism	-0.613	-0.665	-1.928**	-1.411+	-1.573+	-1.549
	(0.935)	(0.981)	(0.672)	(0.808)	(0.943)	(1.388)
Bicameralism	-2.612***	-2.636***	-1.441*	-2.458*	-5.770***	-8.278***
	(0.296)	(0.295)	(0.607)	(0.989)	(1.397)	(2.249)
Abs. Majority	-2.887***	-3.198***	-0.335	14.489***	-7.623***	-9.529***
Confidence	(0.656)	(0.718)	(1.297)	(1.568)	(1.917)	(2.687)
Constructive	-1.793*	-1.340	-3.358**	-21.378***	-16.887***	-14.238***
Confidence	(0.729)	(0.969)	(1.246)	(1.914)	(1.476)	(1.541)
Unemployment		0.030		-0.207		0.148
Rate[15]		(0.029)		(0.371)		(0.117)
Inflation		0.005**		0.001		0.021***
		(0.002)		(0.006)		(0.006)
Days to next election	-0.002***	-0.002***	0.004**	0.007***	-0.006***	-0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
AIC	384.668	352.675	327.104	238.008	212.987	188.541
BIC	540.087	506.926	493.624	324.102	372.106	349.967
Log Likelihood	-150.334	-133.337	-118.552	-95.004	-63.494	-49.270
Observations	299	267	299	267	299	267

[14] Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

[15] Model 37 for replacement cabinets would not converge when the raw unemployment rate was included. Model 37 in Table A7 presents the results with the natural log of the unemployment rate.

Table A8. Cox Proportional Hazards Analysis using only the PDDA sample[16]

	(40) Combined Risk 1	(41) Combined Risk 2	(42) Replacement Risk 1	(43) Replacement Risk 2	(44) Election Risk 1	(45) Election Risk 2
Ideological	2.221***	2.211***	2.231***	2.351***	0.051	0.665
Disagreement	(0.654)	(0.572)	(0.504)	(0.540)	(1.059)	(1.052)
C-ENMI	0.088*	0.095*	0.079**	0.101***	0.025	0.043
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.059)	(0.057)
Ideological	-0.131**	-0.134**	-0.134**	-0.153***	0.009	-0.023
Disagreement X	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.081)
C-ENMI						
Coalition	0.092	0.295	-0.450	-0.642	0.181	0.750+
Agreement	(0.351)	(0.341)	(0.335)	(0.398)	(0.539)	(0.441)
Policies in Coal	-0.003	-0.005	0.001	0.004	-0.008	-0.020***
Agreement	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Surplus Majority	0.732**	0.600*	0.627**	0.779***	-0.293	-1.176+
Coalition	(0.225)	(0.236)	(0.200)	(0.205)	(0.442)	(0.634)
Minimum	-1.622***	-1.295***	-1.076***	-1.008***	-1.232*	-1.006+
Winning	(0.293)	(0.307)	(0.272)	(0.283)	(0.481)	(0.588)
Coalition						
Ideol. Connected	0.107	0.139	0.123	0.019	-0.066	-0.001
Coalition	(0.194)	(0.210)	(0.169)	(0.184)	(0.306)	(0.305)
New Cabinet	-0.031	-0.014	-0.530+	-0.417+	0.125	0.302
	(0.304)	(0.283)	(0.282)	(0.250)	(0.461)	(0.479)
Investiture Vote	0.492	0.303	0.447	0.179	0.709	0.684
	(0.355)	(0.342)	(0.280)	(0.324)	(0.562)	(0.520)
Presidentialism	0.719*	0.336	1.159***	1.176***	0.582	0.304
	(0.316)	(0.305)	(0.271)	(0.263)	(0.495)	(0.574)
Bicameralism	0.959**	0.820**	0.869**	1.030**	0.380	0.364
	(0.329)	(0.315)	(0.289)	(0.335)	(0.517)	(0.544)
Dimension By	-0.598+	-0.498	-0.187	-0.111	-1.083	-1.114
Dimension	(0.311)	(0.304)	(0.224)	(0.233)	(0.676)	(0.694)
Median						
Parliamentary	-0.356	-0.254	-0.313	-0.116	0.020	-0.131
Range	(0.277)	(0.257)	(0.226)	(0.228)	(0.350)	(0.353)
Days to Next	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***
Election	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Inflation		0.022*		0.006		0.057***
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.013)

[16] Results are from a Cox Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present *p*-values in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Unemployment Rate		0.065** (0.022)		0.024 (0.021)		0.184*** (0.038)
AIC	1416.993	1200.486	1504.276	1241.928	477.212	395.310
BIC	1469.934	1257.628	1557.218	1299.070	530.153	452.452
χ^2	92.766	90.499	178.791	139.470	77.987	112.410
Log Likelihood	-693.496	-583.243	-737.138	-603.964	-223.606	-180.655
Observations	252	213	252	213	252	213

Table A9. Non-Proportional Hazards Analysis using only the PDDA sample[17]

	(46) Combined Risk 1	(47) Combined Risk 2	(48) Replacement Risk 1	(49) Replacement Risk 2	(50) Election Risk 1	(51) Election Risk 2
Ideological Disagreement	0.913 (1.013)	0.558 (0.934)	1.294 (0.833)	1.096 (0.786)	-1.268 (1.191)	-0.555 (1.101)
C-ENMI	2.267*** (0.282)	2.537*** (0.302)	1.813*** (0.210)	2.121*** (0.228)	2.471*** (0.512)	2.381*** (0.493)
C-ENMI X ln(days)	-0.355*** (0.046)	-0.395*** (0.050)	-0.276*** (0.034)	-0.318*** (0.036)	-0.387*** (0.079)	-0.370*** (0.076)
Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI	0.307* (0.148)	0.411** (0.158)	0.229 (0.147)	0.342* (0.161)	0.423* (0.180)	0.570* (0.239)
Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI X ln(days)	-0.046 (0.029)	-0.058+ (0.030)	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.055* (0.026)	-0.047 (0.036)	-0.073+ (0.039)
Coalition Agreement	0.639+ (0.329)	0.816+ (0.425)	-0.044 (0.295)	-0.304 (0.351)	0.878 (0.568)	1.519* (0.600)
Policies in Coal Agreement	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.012* (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.007)
Surplus Majority Coalition	0.295 (0.183)	0.279 (0.216)	0.321+ (0.192)	0.534* (0.223)	-1.060* (0.514)	-1.749* (0.694)
Minimum Winning Coalition	-1.040** (0.340)	-0.653* (0.265)	-0.502 (0.379)	-0.365 (0.360)	-0.472 (0.427)	-0.146 (0.527)
Ideol. Connected Coalition	-0.051 (0.182)	-0.132 (0.177)	-0.127 (0.187)	-0.300+ (0.179)	-0.445 (0.290)	-0.284 (0.309)
New Cabinet	0.107 (0.255)	0.233 (0.283)	-0.508 (0.336)	-0.278 (0.332)	0.014 (0.498)	0.374 (0.532)
Investiture Vote	0.076 (0.286)	-0.197 (0.314)	-0.089 (0.322)	-0.377 (0.416)	0.187 (0.505)	0.033 (0.495)
Presidentialism	0.274 (0.311)	-0.221 (0.288)	0.679* (0.327)	0.556+ (0.296)	-0.184 (0.523)	-0.712 (0.606)
Bicameralism	0.942***	0.799**	0.865**	0.951*	0.370	0.142

[17] Results are from a Cox Non-Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present *p*-values in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

	(0.280)	(0.290)	(0.322)	(0.382)	(0.424)	(0.466)
Dimension By	-0.138	0.036	0.249	0.507*	-0.490	-0.565
Dimension Median	(0.231)	(0.257)	(0.217)	(0.251)	(0.485)	(0.505)
Parliamentary	-0.815**	-0.556*	-0.471+	-0.240	0.169	-0.009
Range	(0.297)	(0.225)	(0.257)	(0.220)	(0.312)	(0.334)
Days to Next	0.001*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001+	-0.001*
Election	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Inflation		0.015+		-0.007		0.059**
		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.019)
Unemployment		0.028		-0.012		0.183***
Rate		(0.023)		(0.026)		(0.048)
AIC	1009.800	821.588	1211.835	962.385	343.342	287.491
BIC	1069.801	885.452	1271.835	1026.250	403.342	351.356
χ^2	200.516	178.406	191.955	183.301	120.838	92.986
Log Likelihood	-487.900	-391.794	-588.917	-462.192	-154.671	-124.746
Observations	252	213	252	213	252	213

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Notes

[1] According to the ERDDA, Belgian coalitions last approximately 1 year 8 months in the sample.

[2] Following Laver (2003), I define coalition duration as the "elapsed time between the formation of a government and its termination" (24). I consider government terminations from the following causes; "There is an election; the Prime Minister changes; the partisan composition of the cabinet changes; the government voluntarily or involuntarily resigns and the head of state subsequently accepts this resignation" (Laver 2003, 26).

[3] Parties value policy accountability either because they are policy motivated or instrumentally in order to avoid being labeled as lacking accountability (Strøm 1990).

[4] This framework fits well with the logic of Kircheimer's (1990) concept of the catch-all party. Kircheimer (1990) argues that catch-all parties decrease their dependence on traditional ideological constituents by appealing to all constituencies in society. These parties address more diverse policies because they seek to maintain broad electoral support (Kirchheimer 1990). For example, socialist parties across Europe seeking to widen their electoral appeal decreased their policy focus on labor issues and increased the breadth of issues in their platforms (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). However, more issue or policy focused parties such as green or anti-immigrant parties tend to be motivated by a specific, limited set of issues such as the environment or immigration. Although these parties also consider their electoral success, they historically tend to be motivated more by their policy goals than socialist or conservative parties that offer

more comprehensive electoral platforms (Adams et al. 2006; Spoon 2011; Meyer and Wagner 2013; Meyer and Miller 2015).

[5] Scholars dedicate substantial attention to the role of parties' preferences and issue salience in election campaigns. See for example, Adams (1999), Ezrow (2007), Green and Hobolt (2008), Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), Somer-Topcu (2009), Ezrow et al. (2011), Green (2011), Spoon (2011), de Vries and Hobolt (2012) and Greene (2015).

[6] In this context, coalition ministers may have greater autonomy akin to Laver and Shepsle's (1996) portfolio dictatorships.

[7] Unlike Laver and Shepsle (1996), this perspective assumes that ministers do not hold complete dictatorships over policy-making in their respective issue jurisdictions, but instead engage in compromise on each issue. Laver and Shepsle's (1996) approach might suggest that instead of perceiving coalitions as a series of issue based compromises, parties are given complete discretion on the portfolios under their control. From their perspective, ENMI might matter differently, as parties with greater attention to a small number of issues would focus their policy resources on those issues. This would suggest that issue focused parties could engage in log rolls or policy trades that might instead increase the coalition's stability. Parties dedicating their attention to a smaller number of issues would provide coalitions with the opportunity to use log rolls between coalition partners to arrive at agreements. This approach would then suggest that parties focused intensely on a small number of issues might actually stabilize coalitions in the face of strong ideological disagreements by allowing for policy swaps across issues. There is substantial evidence, however, that coalitions use

numerous tools to oversee the policy behaviors of coalition partners, particularly when they are ideologically distant and hold the portfolio's issues highly salient (e.g. Saalfeld 2000; Thies 2011; Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene and Jensen 2014). Coalition oversight suggests that parties attempt to constrain the behaviors of ministers from other parties. This evidence is inconsistent with Laver and Sheplse's (1996) perspective of ministers as policy dictators.

[8] The usage of tools such as junior ministers and parliamentary scrutiny on salient issues by coalition partners (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2011; Greene and Jensen 2014), likely provides the mechanism for parties to monitor their coalition partners' policy drift (Thies 2001). Other mechanisms for parliamentary oversight such as committees or resignation rules mean that salient divisions will likely cause coalitions to terminate more quickly as divisions have stronger consequences for coalition parties' policy images and ability to control government (Saalfeld 2000).

[9] Like Strom and Swindle (2002), I count early elections as those held more than 90 days before the next mandatory election.

[10] I present the results from analyses using only the sample (15 countries up to 1999) from the *Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive* (PDDA) in the Appendix (Strøm et al. 2008).

[11] The sample includes observations from all coalition governments in Austria (1949-2008), Belgium (1946-2007), Bulgaria(2005), Czech Republic (1992-2010), Denmark (1950-2007), Estonia (1995-2009), Finland (1945-2007), France (1959-1999), Germany (1949-2009), Greece (1989), Iceland (1946-2009), Ireland (1948-2007), Italy (1946-2006),

Latvia(1998-2006), Lithuania (2000-2001), Luxembourg (1945-2009), the Netherlands (1946-2010), Norway (1963-2009), Poland(1991-2007), Portugal (1978-1985), Romania (1991-2009), Slovakia (1998-2010), Slovenia (1990-2008), and Sweden (1951-2006).

[12] For similar measures of issue salience and party politics, see Nyblade (2004), Stoll (2011), or Greene (2015).

[13] See the Online Appendix for a more detailed discussion of ENMI.

[14] Intriguingly, C-ENMI is only weakly associated with coalition duration in the full sample (Pearsons' correlation coefficient .19). ENMI does more than capture the difference between party size. The variables only weakly correlate (.1). For additional information on the construction and distribution of ENMI, see the Appendix.

[15] Results are similar for models that use the coalition-party as the unit of analysis, although the effect of nearly all the independent variables becomes non-proportional, suggesting that the effect of these variables on parties' strategies is likely different depending on the point in the coalition's life cycle. As an alternate strategy, I also ran the analysis using multiple measures of ENMI to account for the party with the lowest and the highest levels of ENMI in the coalition. Intriguingly, mean coalition ENMI performs the best as it integrates information from each of the coalition parties. For additional information and the results of these replications, see the Appendix.

[16] While many scholars cite the shortcomings of the CMP's left-right scale, they suggest improvements to this scale to make its estimates more reliable. In particular, Lowe et al. (2011) use a logged scale to more accurately measure the distribution of parties'

preferences. This is slightly different than Saalfeld's (2008) analysis which uses the original left-right scale.

[17] Data on pre- and post-electoral agreement and a count of the number of policies included in the coalition agreement are included in a sub-sample analysis of the data from the PDDA in the Appendix (Golder 2006; Eichorst 2014; Ibenskas 2015). More expansive coalition agreements should suggest a more durable coalition. The results are substantively similar to those presented in the main analysis.

[18] To account for potential confounding heterogeneity from country or period effects, I have run a series of robustness checks that include fixed effects for country and decades in a Weibull model, and shared frailty (random effects) for election date effects. These results are largely consistent with the theory and are presented in the Online Appendix.

[19] The models presented in Table 3 only include interactions with the variables proposed to violate the assumption. Robustness checks accounting for all variables that violate the proportional hazards assumption fail to converge in most cases. In an analysis that selectively controls for these violations to account for the strongest levels of significance, I find results substantively similar to those presented in the main analysis, although high levels of multicollinearity lead many models to not converge.

[20] Given the theoretical expectation for the violation of the Proportional Hazard Assumption it is unsurprising that no variables are significant in a simple version of the model without the interaction of time.

[21] The predicted hazard rates are based on the estimates in Model 8. The Wald test of the joint significance of the coefficients for C-ENMI, ideological disagreement and their interaction is significant at the 99.9% level in both Model 7 and Model 8.

[22] While previous studies have not revealed statistically significant non-proportionalities (Warwick 1994; Diermeier and Stevenson 1999), strategic bargaining contexts such as coalition governance make the presence of non-proportionalities unsurprising (Licht 2011). Statistically, the non-proportionalities can be directly modeled by including an interaction of the variables violating the assumption with a function of time to allow the effect of the variable to change (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Licht 2011). Models in which each variable violating the proportional hazards assumption is interacted with time fail to converge. Therefore, I only present models with the variable that the theory predicts a violation interacted with time. The results are largely consistent when other violating variables are also included, although many of these models fail to converge due to multicollinearity.

[23] The combined risk and the risk of new elections fail the PHA at the 95% and 99.9% levels, but global tests of the Schoenfeld residuals do not show evidence that the PHA is violated in the primary models at standard levels of significance.

[24] Many of the residuals are statistically significant at the .01 level. Analyses with interactions for the log of time with C-ENMI, C-ENMI X ideological disagreement and a number of the control variables fail to converge.

[25] Direct interpretation of the coefficients deserves caution due to the large number of interactions (for further discussion of non-proportionalities and their interpretation see Licht 2011).

[26] I exclude low and high values of the dependent variable from the prediction for graphical clarity. The confidence intervals in the first year are sufficiently large to make all differences following that time difficult to visually interpret. The first difference percentage predicted change to the hazard rate is for a change from one standard deviation below the mean C-ENMI to one deviation above the mean C-ENMI holding disagreement at the minimum value and at two standard deviations above the mean. 95% confidence intervals around the median calculated change are based on a draw of 1000 estimates from the variance-covariance matrix of a Non Proportional Hazards (NPH) Cox model. Estimates are from Model 9 and Model 14 using Licht's (2011) method of calculating First Differences for COX NPH models. Predicted effects are smoothed using lowess.

[27] The strong increase in risk across the models might be overstated given that the baseline hazard of failure for either type is extremely low in the first year of the coalition.

[28] The 1988 five party cabinet led by Marten included five parties with a coalition average ENMI of nearly 20 (nearly half a standard deviation above the mean sample coalition ENMI) and lasted 1238 days, despite over a standard deviation above mean disagreement (.963).