

1 **Developing robust composite measures of healthcare quality -**
2 **Ranking intervals and dominance relations for Scottish Health Boards**

3
4 **Laura K Schang, Yrjänä Hynninen, Alec Morton, Ahti Salo**
5

6 **ABSTRACT**

7 Although composite indicators are widely used to inform health system performance
8 comparisons, such measures typically embed contentious assumptions, for instance about
9 the weights assigned to constituent indicators. Moreover, although many comparative
10 measures are constructed as ratios, the choice of denominator is not always
11 straightforward. The conventional approach is to determine a single set of weights and to
12 choose a single denominator, even though this involves considerable methodological
13 difficulties.

14 This study proposes an alternative approach to handle the lack of information about an
15 appropriate set of weights and about a defensible denominator in composite indicators
16 which considers all feasible weights and can incorporate multiple denominators. We
17 illustrate this approach for comparative quality assessments of Scottish Health Boards. The
18 results (displayed as ranking intervals and dominance relations) help identify Boards
19 which cannot be ranked, say, worse than 4th or better than 7th.

20 Such rankings give policy-makers a sense of the uncertainty around ranks, indicating the
21 extent to which action is warranted. By identifying the full range of rankings that the
22 organizations under comparison may attain, the approach proposed here acknowledges
23 imperfect information about the “correct” set of weights and the appropriate denominator

24 and may thus help to increase transparency of and confidence in health system
25 performance comparisons.

26 **Key words:** performance comparison; composite indicator; weight; denominator; ranking
27 interval; dominance relation.

28 **1 INTRODUCTION**

29 The increasing complexity of health systems and the multidimensionality of health system
30 performance have reinforced calls for the production of composite measures of
31 performance (WHO, 2000, Healthcare Commission, 2005, CMS, 2009, Carinci et al., 2015).
32 Summarizing the information contained in diverse indicators in a single index and ranking
33 organisations or countries on that basis has the potential to present the “big picture“, by
34 highlighting in a unified way to what extent the objectives of health systems related to
35 health outcomes, treatment appropriateness, and other dimensions have been met. As
36 such, composite measures may seem an attractive approach to strengthen accountability,
37 facilitate communication with the public, and focus improvement efforts on poorly
38 performing organisations (Goddard and Jacobs, 2009).

39

40 However, composite indicators also have important disadvantages. In contrast to assessing
41 performance based on a range of separate indicators, rankings based on aggregate
42 measures may disguise the sources of poor performance and thus obscure the best focus
43 for remedial action (Smith, 2002). Composite indicators are also highly sensitive to
44 methodological choices, in particular to the weights attached to constituent indicators (see

45 e.g. Jacobs et al., 2005, Reeves et al., 2007, OECD, 2008). In their analysis of hospital
46 performance based on star ratings in the English NHS, Jacobs et al. (2005) show, for
47 instance, how subtle changes in the weighting system lead some hospitals to jump almost
48 half of the league table. However, the techniques by which weights are determined are
49 unlikely to be straightforward. In addition, although many comparative quality measures
50 are constructed as ratios, it is not necessarily obvious which indicators should be employed
51 as denominators (Schlaud et al., 1998). In the context of low-birthweight survival rates,
52 Guillen et al. (2011) illustrate how the choice of population denominator results in
53 considerable variation depending on whether survival is reported relative to all births; live
54 births; or neonatal intensive care unit admissions.

55

56 These concerns are critical especially when rankings have serious consequences for the
57 rankees. For example, six of the Chief Executives of the twelve lowest ranked hospitals in
58 England's star rating system (the so-called "dirty dozen") lost their jobs as a result (Bevan
59 and Hamblin, 2009). It has been argued that France and Spain's apparently high ranking in
60 the WHO's 2000 assessment of health systems substantially diminished pressure for
61 reform in these countries (Navarro, 2000). In Medicare's Premier Hospital Quality
62 Incentive Demonstration, a pay-for-performance scheme based on a composite quality
63 score, hospitals below the ninth decile faced a 2% deduction in their Medicare payment
64 (CMS, 2009). With such high stakes, understanding whether ranks are robust to alternative
65 assumptions seems critical.

66

67 This study proposes an alternative approach to handle the lack of information about an

68 appropriate set of weights and about a defensible denominator in composite indicators. We
69 make two main contributions. First, we demonstrate the use of an approach to ranking
70 organisations based on ranking intervals and dominance relations which accounts for the
71 full set of feasible weights. This avoids the need to settle on a single, potentially
72 controversial set of weights as it is required for instance in data envelopment analysis
73 (DEA), in which weights are chosen such that each organisation appears in its best possible
74 light (Cherchye et al., 2007). Feasible weights are less restrictive and thus potentially better
75 able to increase transparency and to acknowledge imperfect information about the
76 “correct” set of weights. The ranking intervals obtained with this approach can be said to
77 be robust in the sense that they reflect the full range of rankings that the organizations
78 under comparison may attain when weights are selected from their respective feasible
79 weight sets. Second, we address the problem of choice of denominator in ratio-based
80 measures of performance.

81

82 **2 CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING COMPOSITE INDICATORS OF** 83 **HEALTHCARE QUALITY**

84 A composite indicator is commonly expressed as an additive model based on a weighted
85 sum of a set of performance indicators

$$86 \quad C_k = \sum_{j=1}^J w_j x_{jk}, \quad (1)$$

87 where J is the number of constituent indicators, w_j is the weight attached to indicator j , and
88 x_{jk} the score on indicator j for organisation k . Composite measures of this form require
89 choices about (i) the set of indicators included; (ii) the methods used to transform the
90 constituent indicators (in order to achieve a common unit of measurement); (iii) the
91 weights applied; (iv) any specific aggregation rules used; and (v) potential adjustments for
92 environmental or other uncontrollable influences on performance. In addition (vi),
93 although many healthcare quality indicators that are used to construct a composite
94 indicator are reported as ratios, the choice of denominator is not always straightforward.

95 The focus of this study is on problems (iii) and (vi), how to handle a lack of information
96 about the appropriate set of weights and about the choice of denominator. Below we set
97 out the conceptual background and problems with conventional strategies to address these
98 challenges. In the empirical application, we explain the approaches taken to problems (i),
99 (ii), (iv) and (v).

100 **2.1 Valuation of multiple healthcare quality measures**

101 Healthcare performance measures are multidimensional. However, without a functioning
102 market, there is no price mechanism for comparison. To aggregate heterogeneous
103 indicators into a summary measure of performance, weights are required which –
104 analogous to prices – should represent the opportunity cost of achieving improvements on
105 each individual measure by capturing the relative value attached to an extra unit of it
106 (Smith, 2002).

107

108 In practice, arriving at explicit trade-offs between different healthcare quality measures –
109 and thus exact specifications of weights – is highly contentious. First, it is often unclear
110 *whose* preferences should be elicited. Weights used often reflect a single set of preferences,
111 although the evidence suggests substantial heterogeneity in preferences between and
112 within groups of policy-makers, patients and the public (Smith, 2002, Decancq and Lugo,
113 2012). Making precise judgments about the relative value of sub-indicators to the
114 composite is typically both politically controversial and cognitively demanding, thus
115 triggering reluctance among respondents to agree on a set of weights.

116

117 Second, there is no consensus on a single best method *how* to elicit weights. Different
118 techniques for valuing health(care) outcomes – from simpler trade-off methods including
119 ranking from most to least desired indicator and voting techniques to more elaborate
120 multi-attribute approaches such as conjoint analysis and the analytic hierarchy process –
121 tend to produce different results. Each method has distinct advantages and disadvantages
122 in terms of feasibility, consistency and validity (Dolan, 1997, OECD, 2008, Appleby and
123 Mulligan, 2000).

124

125 To circumvent perceived difficulties with normative approaches to set weights, data-driven
126 weighting systems are frequently used. For example, data envelopment analysis (DEA) –
127 one of the most widespread methods to compare organisations with multiple outputs and
128 inputs (Hollingsworth and Street, 2006) – uses empirically derived, flexible weights,
129 following a “benefit of the doubt” approach. It is however questionable whether data-

130 driven weights reflect meaningful trade-offs between performance domains (Decancq and
131 Lugo, 2012). There is no logical reason why an organisation necessarily values most some
132 performance domain because it performs relatively well on it: data-driven approaches thus
133 purport to solve a deep philosophical problem of how to derive values from facts (Hume,
134 1739).

135
136 The conventional recommendation to address the lack of clarity about weights, and about
137 the best method to elicit weights, is to conduct extensive sensitivity analysis on the chosen
138 weights (Jacobs et al., 2005). However, traditional sensitivity analysis is problematic
139 insofar as the choice of ranges of weights typically depends on the analyst. This form of
140 sensitivity analysis thus corresponds to a “blind search” which is not explicitly oriented
141 towards changes in ranks and the maximum and minimum plausible ranks an organisation
142 can attain.

143 **2.2 Choice of denominators**

144 Healthcare quality measures are often reported as ratio measures where a specific quality
145 measure is divided by some measure of population. Not all comparative assessments of
146 healthcare quality require necessarily a denominator. So-called “never events”, events
147 which are deemed to be entirely preventable, are reported as absolute numbers without
148 reference to a denominator (NHS England, 2015). However, typically a ratio-based measure
149 is used in order to make entities of different sizes comparable and to establish a common

150 “currency unit” in which performance is assessed as “good” or “poor” relative to other
151 organisations.

152

153 To construct ratio-based quality measures, the denominator should represent the best
154 available proxy for the population at risk (Romano et al., 2010). However, the population at
155 risk of experiencing a specific event is not always obvious. Suppose a national government
156 wants to assess performance on health-care associated infections (HAIs) among local
157 health authorities which are responsible for protecting the health of their local populations.
158 To measure health authority performance on HAIs, two measures of the PAR have been
159 proposed: hospital occupied bed days (OBDs) and total population living in the health
160 authority area (Health Protection Scotland, 2007).

161

162 Using OBDs as the denominator implies that each day spent in the hospital puts patients at
163 risk of acquiring an infection there. However, OBDs ignore that some infections are not
164 acquired in hospital but in the community (Health Protection Scotland, 2014). Using OBDs
165 as the denominator might thus underestimate the actual number of exposed individuals.
166 Total population as a measure of the PAR, in contrast, implies the view that every person
167 could acquire an infection, independent of hospital activity (Health Protection Scotland,
168 2007). Nevertheless, total population might overestimate the population at risk by
169 including individuals facing no or a negligible risk of experiencing the event (Marlow,
170 1995).

171

172 Ideally, one would specify a numerator that is unambiguously linked to one single
173 denominator (McKibben et al., 2005); for example, by excluding community-acquired
174 infections that are present on admission to hospital from the numerator. In practice, it is
175 however often difficult to distinguish between infections that were present on admission
176 and those acquired during a hospital stay (Naessens and Huschka, 2004, Zhan et al., 2007).

177
178 If the “correct” population at risk is not obvious, then Guillen et al. (2011) recommend to
179 consider different denominators to acquire a more complete perspective on the outcome of
180 interest. To do this, one could produce multiple ratios between all reasonable numerator
181 and denominator combinations. However, the manual comparison of multiple performance
182 ratios quickly becomes unwieldy. In a situation with, say, four numerators and three
183 denominators, one would obtain 12 performance ratios for each entity under scrutiny.

184

185

186 **3 METHODS**

187 **3.1 Ranking intervals and dominance relations for all feasible** 188 **weights**

189 We here examine the use of an alternative approach to handle the lack of knowledge about
190 appropriate weights and about a defensible denominator. Rather than specifying explicit
191 weights, this approach consists in developing ranking intervals and dominance relations

192 based on the full set of feasible weights. The approach is also able to handle different
193 choices of denominator variables.

194

195 We use the ratio-based efficiency analysis (REA) technique (Salo and Punkka, 2011).
196 Suppose there are K Decision-Making Units (DMUs – the entities to be evaluated) that have
197 N different measures for the numerator of a ratio and M measures for the denominator of a
198 ratio. The values of the n th numerator and the m th denominator of the k th DMU are
199 $y_{nk} \geq 0$ and $x_{mk} \geq 0$, respectively. Thus, the possible performance ratios of the DMU k are
200 y_{nk}/x_{mk} , where $n = 1, \dots, N$ and $m = 1, \dots, M$.

201

202 REA enables the aggregation of different numerators and denominators in a summary
203 measure of performance. The relative importance of the n th numerator and the m th
204 denominator is captured by nonnegative weights u_n and v_m , respectively. The aggregated
205 performance ratio of DMU k is defined as

206
$$E_k(u, v) = \frac{\sum_n u_n y_{nk}}{\sum_m v_m x_{mk}}. \quad (2)$$

207

208 To examine the pairwise relations between DMUs, REA uses the concept of dominance:
209 DMU k dominates DMU l if the performance ratio of DMU k is at least as high as that of
210 DMU l for all feasible weights and there exist some weights for which its performance ratio
211 is strictly higher. If a dominance relation exists between two DMUs, one can be confident
212 that for any set of assumption, one DMU outperforms the other. The dominance relation
213 between DMUs k and l is determined by the pairwise performance ratio

214
$$D_{k,l}(u, v) = \frac{E_k(u,v)}{E_l(u,v)}. \quad (3)$$

215
216 The maximum and the minimum of $D_{k,l}(u, v)$ over all feasible weights provide upper and
217 lower interval bounds on how well DMU k performs relative to DMU l . Thus, if the
218 minimum of $D_{k,l}$ is greater than one, DMU k dominates DMU l .

219
220 The ranking interval indicates the best and worst performance rankings a DMU k can attain
221 relative to other DMUs over all feasible weights. The best ranking is determined by the
222 minimum number of other DMUs with a strictly higher performance ratio. For instance, the
223 best ranking as third for a given DMU means that, no matter how the weights are selected,
224 there are at least two other DMUs with a strictly higher performance ratio. If for some
225 feasible weights the performance ratio of a DMU is higher than or equal to the ratio of any
226 other DMU, then its best ranking will be one. The worst ranking is computed similarly.

227
228 The results of REA (ratio and ranking intervals and dominance graphs) are computed using
229 general programming methods such as linear programming and mixed integer
230 programming.

231

232 **3.2 Method strengths and limitations**

233 There are several innovative characteristics, and advantages, to this approach. First, the
234 aggregation of numerators and the denominators is achieved without fixing a single set of

235 weights for each DMU. While weights are derived analytically (as in DEA), the key
236 innovation of REA is that one compares the relative magnitude of the performance ratios
237 between DMUs for all feasible weights (rather than applying the most favourable weighting
238 of variables to each organisation as in DEA (Cherchye et al., 2007)). Although one can
239 obtain ranking intervals with DEA (by applying different sets of weight restrictions), these
240 intervals still represent the highest possible performance for each set of weight
241 restrictions. In REA, the upper limit of the performance ratio interval is identical to the
242 performance score of DEA. In addition, however, the lower limit of intervals in REA shows
243 organizational performance for the least advantageous weighting. Thus, one can produce
244 robust information about organizational performance in the sense that the resulting
245 intervals reflect the full range of rankings that DMUs may attain for all feasible weights.

246
247 Second, REA calculates pairwise comparisons between DMUs rather than comparing each
248 DMU to an efficient frontier as in DEA or stochastic frontier analysis. This makes REA
249 results more robust than frontier-based results, since the introduction or removal of an
250 outlier DMU can substantially change the location of the efficiency frontier (Banker et al.,
251 1986). In contrast, already established pairwise dominance relations obtained from REA
252 cannot change if a new DMU is added; and the end points of any DMU's ranking interval can
253 shift towards lower performance by at most one ranking.

254
255 Third, because the REA is based on pairwise comparisons, it requires a minimum of only
256 two DMUs. In contrast, frontier-based methods typically require a larger number of DMUs
257 to construct the frontier. For DEA, for instance, Banker et al. (1986) proposed the simple

258 rule of thumb that the number of DMUs should be at least three times the number of
259 variables. This is problematic because the number of indicators typically far outstrips the
260 number of organisations.

261
262 It is important to point out that, where the choice of denominator is relatively
263 straightforward, ratio-based analysis is not necessary. One can calculate individual
264 performance rates for the respective indicators and aggregate them as a weighted sum as
265 in equation (1). This is akin to evaluating the numerator of the performance ratio (2).

266
267 We here use a ratio-based analysis in order to illustrate robustness to different choices of
268 denominator. Ratio-based measures have certain limitations. In particular, the use of a
269 ratio function does not account for structural differences (such as a higher share of fixed
270 costs) between organisations. This assumption implies that, in evaluating organisational
271 performance, one does for instance not “allow” an organisation a comparatively higher
272 number of healthcare-associated infections (in ratio terms, e.g. per 100,000 population)
273 only because it is relatively small in size. However, in the context we examine here –
274 Scottish Health Boards, as outlined below – this assumption seems justified since these
275 Boards are allocated resources in line with a formula which seeks to compensate for
276 structural differences so as to ensure a level playing field across organisations.

277
278 Ratio measures may be preferred when there is primarily a concern with evaluation
279 (examining which organisations perform comparatively better or worse) rather than

280 explanation (examining why organisations achieve particular performance outcomes, as in
281 regression analysis). This paper is limited to the problem of comparative evaluation.

282 **3.3 System context and data**

283 **Selection of indicators.** We illustrate the robust ranking interval approach in the context
284 of comparative quality assessments of Scottish Health Boards. In Scotland, responsibility
285 for the allocation of resources is decentralized to 14 territorial Boards. The ultimate
286 objectives of these Boards are to protect and improve the health of their populations
287 through planning for and delivering health services (Scottish Government, 2014). To
288 construct a composite indicator of the quality of care provided by Boards, we confined
289 ourselves to indicators used in the HEAT target system. This existing performance
290 management system is used by the Scottish Government to assess Health Board
291 performance. All indicators used here (Table 1) come from the official performance
292 measurement system, but are not meant to represent an exhaustive set of health system
293 objectives. To address the two problems examined in this study, we use two data sets:

294
295 ***Part I:*** To examine robustness to choices of weights, we analyse six indicators from the
296 HEAT target system which are intended to measure Boards' relative degree of achievement
297 in ensuring appropriate treatment. This analysis is based on an additive model which is
298 akin to analyzing the numerator of the performance ratio in equation (2).

299 ***Part II:*** To examine robustness to alternative choices of denominator (here, the population
300 at risk of experiencing an infection), we relate the number of two types of HAIs
301 (MRSA/MSSA and C.difficile infections) to OBDs and total population. This analysis relies
302 on the more complex ratio-based model in equation (2). We focus on HAIs because there is
303 a good justification for two alternative denominators, bed days and total population (as set
304 out in section 2.2). The REA-based analysis with two numerators and two denominators
305 thus shows the full strength of the ratio-based approach. However, our focus on HAIs does
306 not mean that for the other four quality indicators, no alternative denominators might be
307 possible.

308 **Data transformation.** To avoid mixing different units of measurement and to achieve scale
309 invariance, data were normalized to the [0;1] range by dividing each value by the maximum
310 value for a given indicator.

311
312 **Environmental adjustment.** The 14 Health Boards differ in terms of demographic,
313 epidemiological and regional factors which are beyond their control but might influence
314 observed performance. However, in Scotland, Health Boards are allocated resources based
315 on a formula that takes account of variations in healthcare needs which arise from
316 differences in age and sex composition, morbidity, life circumstances, and excess costs of
317 delivering services in some (especially rural) regions which are deemed unavoidable (ISD
318 Scotland, 2010). Thus, Boards have already been compensated for structural differences so
319 that they can ensure the same level of quality. We acknowledge that the risk adjustment
320 provided by this formula is not perfect. However, following this argument, it is not

321 unreasonable to assume that Boards are comparable with respect to the performance
322 indicators analysed here.

323 *Tables 1 and 2 about here*

324 **3.4 Weight restrictions on quality measures**

325 An advantage of REA is its ability to address incomplete information about weight
326 specifications by using the full set of feasible weights. This can be an attractive option when
327 one assumes complete ignorance about the relative value of averting particular events.
328 However, while an elicitation of cardinal preferences over “how much” worse a, say, MRSA
329 infection is compared to, say, an emergency admission may not be feasible (e.g. due to high
330 cognitive demands) or desirable (e.g. due to biases introduced by specific elicitation
331 methods), it may be possible to obtain statements about which events are worse than
332 others.

333 Introducing plausible weight restrictions based on ordinal preferences can be useful
334 because this recognises people’s ability to provide limited preference information about
335 the relative badness of particular events without imposing implausibly exact weights.
336 Restrictions on weights can be used to prevent inconsistencies with accepted views on the
337 relative importance of measures analysed (Allen et al., 1997, Pedraja-Chaparro et al., 1997).

338

339 Based on their own subjective assessment, the research team arrived at a set of ordinal
340 weights through pairwise comparisons of any two quality measures, along the lines “*If you*

341 *could avoid either an emergency admission to hospital or an MRSA infection, which event*
342 *would you rather avoid".* Corresponding to their relative badness, events were ranked as
343 follows (from worst=1 to least bad=6):

- 344 1. an MRSA/MSSA infection;
- 345 2. an emergency admission;
- 346 3. a C.difficile infection;
- 347 4. having to wait longer than 18 weeks from referral to treatment;
- 348 5. having to wait more than 4 hours in A&E (we assumed a condition where patients are
349 in mild to moderate discomfort);
- 350 6. a delayed discharge.

351
352 In flexible weighting systems, the composite score may be heavily influenced by a sub-
353 indicator that is marginally important in the wider health system context (Goddard and
354 Jacobs, 2009). To address this problem, for Part I we made the (illustrative but reasonable)
355 assumption that avoiding a particular event can at most have half of the overall value
356 attached to avoiding an event of each of the six quality measures. This resulted in the
357 following proportional weight restrictions: avoiding an event of the worst healthcare
358 quality measure cannot be more than ten times as valuable as avoiding an event of the least
359 bad quality measure (since with six indicators, a ratio of 1/10 means that one quality
360 measure can have at most half of the weight mass).

361
362 For part II, we made the (illustrative but reasonable) assumption that avoiding one
363 C.difficile infection must be at least 1/4 as valuable as avoiding one MRSA/MSSA infection.

364 No weight restrictions for denominator variables were used. In efficiency analysis,
365 denominator weights have a clear interpretation, because they indicate the substitutability
366 of different types of inputs (labor, capital, intermediate inputs). In quality comparisons,
367 denominators represent different populations at risk. However, denominator weights lack
368 a clear interpretation as in efficiency analysis since it is hard to think about trade-offs
369 between different populations at risk.

370

371 **4 RESULTS**

372 **4.1 Robustness to choices of weights: Unrestricted and restricted** 373 **ranking intervals for feasible weight sets**

374 The ranking intervals (Figures 1-3) show the possible rankings that Boards can attain for
375 different assumptions about weight sets. If one uses all feasible weights (Figure 1), then
376 one obtains wide and overlapping ranking intervals spanning 9 to 14 ranks for a given
377 Board. With ordinal weight restrictions, the width of ranking intervals decreases to 3 to 11
378 ranks (Figure 2). Thus, uncertainty about relative performance decreases as weight
379 restrictions are applied.

380

381 However, the impact of weight restrictions on reductions in uncertainty differs across
382 Boards. For Boards *L* and *H*, ordinal weight restrictions narrow the ranking interval from
383 11 respectively 12 ranks (Figure 1) to 3 possible ranks (Figure 2), thus clarifying Board

384 performance. In contrast, for Boards *N*, *E*, *M* and *A*, ranking intervals remain wider, because
385 these Boards perform comparatively well on some indicators, but comparatively worse on
386 others (Table 2). Hence, the remaining flexibility to set weights influences the ranks these
387 Boards may attain. For 7 out of 14 Boards (*K*, *F*, *B*, *E*, *C*, *A*, *J*), the additional use of
388 proportional weight restrictions (Figure 3) further decreases uncertainty about relative
389 ranks.

390
391 The width of the ranking interval reflects the impact of changes in weights. A narrow
392 interval suggests that a Board's performance is robust to alternative modelling
393 assumptions. For example, Board *L* (Figure 2) is ranked 3rd or higher no matter which
394 assumptions are used. The interval bounds show the impact of modelling assumptions on
395 relative ranks. Thus, one can be confident that Board *F*, for example, cannot be ranked
396 worse than 7th and not better than 3nd.

397 *Figures 1 to 3 about here*

398 **4.2 Dominance relations and comparative scope for improvement**

399 Based on pairwise comparisons, the REA results can be displayed in a unified way as a
400 dominance relation (Figure 4): insofar as Boards are more superordinate or "higher up",
401 their relative performance is more robust to changes in the weights attached to the
402 constituent indicators. Orkney (*K*), Shetland (*L*) and Western Isles (*N*) are top performers
403 since they are not dominated by any other Board. Ayrshire and Arran (*A*), Fife (*D*), Greater
404 Glasgow and Clyde (*G*), Lothian (*J*) and Tayside (*M*) are dominated by the other Boards.

405

406 There are two main reasons for this differentiation status. First, a Board's performance on
407 the constituent indicators plays a role (Table 2). For instance, all three island Boards
408 perform comparatively better than the rest of Scotland on MRSA/MSSA infections, 4-hour
409 A&E waiting times and 18WRTT. Second, the ordinal weight restrictions used influence the
410 dominance relations. In this example, performance on MRSA/MSSA infections is weighted
411 more highly than performance on emergency admissions, which in turn receives a higher
412 weight than performance on C.difficile, etc. Inspection of the underlying data (Table 2)
413 suggests that the five Boards at the bottom of the dominance graph perform comparatively
414 worse on MRSA/MSSA infections and emergency admissions. Nevertheless, their overall
415 performance results from poor performance on several (up to four) indicators and thus not
416 exclusively from the weighting scheme.

417

418 In Table 3, the value in row i and column j represents the minimal proportional
419 improvement which Board i needs to reach Board j (by decreasing its rates, since these are
420 "lower is better" indicators). Thus, if a value on row i and column j is presented, Board j
421 performs better than Board i with all feasible weights and thus dominates Board i . For
422 instance, Board A needs to reduce its rates on all the indicators by 8% so as not to be
423 dominated by Board B. Non-dominated Boards are identified by rows without any values
424 (Boards K, L, and N).

425

426 Multiple values on the same row mean that a Board is dominated by several Boards and
427 would be situated on lower levels of the dominance graph. Looking horizontally, one can

428 see the improvements needed for the five worst performing Boards J, G, D, M, A to become
429 non-dominated by the better-performing Boards. Looking vertically, one can identify the
430 distance that differentiates each Board from the national leaders, Boards K, L and N.

431 *Figure 4 about here*

432 *Table 3 about here*

433

434 **4.3 Ratio-based analysis: Robustness to choice of denominator**

435 Table 4 examines robustness to different choices of denominator. Although relative
436 performance of seven Boards is similar for both denominators, the other seven Boards
437 jump three to eight ranks up or down the ranking depending on whether total population
438 or OBDs is used as the denominator (for C.difficile infections). For MSSA/MSSA, three
439 Boards jump four or five ranks for different choices of denominator. Thus, the choice of
440 denominator will make a difference to measured performance of these Boards on HAIs.

441

442 The REA-based ranking interval, which shows composite performance on MRSA/MSSA and
443 C.difficile relative to OBDs and population, reveals seven Boards (marked in bold in Table
444 4) with a ranking interval spanning seven or more ranks. This uncertainty in ranking
445 reflects, first, sensitivity to choice of denominator (e.g. Borders jumps up four ranks when
446 MRSA/MSSA and C.difficile are measured relative to total population). Second, this may
447 show differences in performance on MRSA/MSSA as opposed to C.difficile (e.g. Forth Valley

448 is ranked 13th on the former but 2nd on the latter relative to OBDs).

449 *Table 4 about here*

450

451

452 **5 DISCUSSION**

453 We have proposed a methodological approach to address two pervasive challenges which
454 make the use of composite measures for robust performance comparisons in healthcare
455 difficult: How should heterogeneous indicators be weighted to obtain an aggregate
456 measure of performance? How to handle a lack of clarity about the “correct” denominator
457 in ratio-based indicators? As Jacobs et al. (2005) note, two responses to the uncertainty
458 inherent in composite indicators would be to dismiss composite indicators altogether and
459 instead estimate relative performance separately for each objective (an example of this is
460 Hauck and Street’s (2006) multivariate multilevel approach that requires no aggregation
461 and weighting of multiple objectives at all); or to invest considerable resources into more
462 sophisticated modelling, such as by means of elaborate preference elicitation.

463

464 In a context where information is inevitably incomplete but policy-makers remain
465 interested in an overall measure of health system performance (OECD, 2008), we have
466 demonstrated how the REA approach offers a third way that openly provides indications of
467 the uncertainty inherent in the valuation of objectives and choices of denominators. The
468 approach is essentially based on agnosticism: When there are multiple reasonable

469 denominators which each highlight aspects of performance – such as that an organisation
470 can deliver high-quality in terms of few HAIs relative to hospitalised and/or general
471 populations – then analysts need not restrict themselves to a single denominator. Our
472 results reinforce the insight that healthcare quality may be best thought of as a collection of
473 possible rates depending on how the denominator is specified rather than as a single
474 “right” rate (Guillen et al., 2011). Ranking intervals based on multiple denominators thus
475 may enable a more complete account of performance.

476
477 Similarly, if we know that quality measures are heterogeneous but are ignorant of the best
478 method to weight them, then methods to construct composite indicators need to capture
479 that lack of knowledge. Sensitivity analysis on weights is not a new idea; prior work –
480 especially in the multidimensional well-being literature – includes explicit use of ranges of
481 weights (Zhou et al., 2010); computation of multiple weighting schemes (Osberg and
482 Sharpe, 2002); and global sensitivity analysis (Saltelli et al., 2008).

483
484 The REA approach adds to this work in two ways. First, consideration of incomplete
485 information is built into the structure of the model. Ranking intervals give policy-makers a
486 sense of the uncertainty around ranks, indicating the extent to which action is warranted.
487 Our results show that, when one assumes complete ignorance about the relative weights
488 assigned to different indicators, then it is impossible to differentiate the performance of
489 Scottish Health Boards (Figure 1). Thus, one cannot say which organisations perform
490 comparatively better or worse. Regulatory action based on such rankings would clearly be
491 premature.

492

493 However, once some reasonable ordinal and proportional weight restrictions are applied,
494 organizational performance appears much clarified. Importantly, the use of REA without
495 any weight restrictions involves no subjectivity (in the sense that weights are derived for
496 all feasible combinations for each pairwise comparison). In contrast, the choice of weight
497 restrictions may differ between groups of people: different individuals may come up with
498 different orderings or proportionate weights concerning the relative badness (or
499 goodness) of particular events. However, if weight restrictions can be established (e.g.
500 based on existing consensus or medical evidence of disease severity), then they may
501 provide useful insights. When an organisation consistently appears at the bottom (Board G)
502 or at the top (Board L; in Figure 2) whichever set of weights is used, this may strengthen
503 the rationale for policy intervention. It supports the notion that settling on a unique set of
504 weights is not always necessary to inform well-founded judgments (Foster and Sen, 1997).

505

506 Second, ranking intervals and dominance relations appear to offer relatively intuitive ways
507 to synthesise key messages contained in disparate indicators. This may help to
508 communicate in a unified way the results of comparative assessments to policy-makers,
509 possibly addressing the limitations of frontier-based approaches such as DEA and
510 stochastic frontier analysis whose complexity has tended to limit their practical influence
511 outside academic circles (Hussey et al., 2009, Hollingsworth and Street, 2006).
512 Visualisation of uncertainty also mitigates the loss of transparency due to opaque
513 methodological choices made about the valuation of objectives (Hauck and Street, 2006).

514

515 REA-type analyses are likely to be particularly useful under conditions where:

516 (i) the audience are policy-makers and managers rather than academics (since
517 results such as being “30% below the efficient frontier“ may not be easily accessible
518 to non-technical audiences and REA requires no concept of an efficient frontier);

519 (ii) there are concerns about rank reversals due to sensitivity to outliers and the
520 introduction or removal of organisations (since pairwise comparisons make REA
521 results relatively robust to these biases); and

522 (iii) there are relatively few organisations (since a large number of organisations is
523 not needed to construct an efficient frontier). However, there are also no inherent
524 limitations to applying REA to large datasets.

525

526

527

528 **6 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH**

529 The agnosticism implied in the REA approach may come at a price of incomplete orderings
530 (in the form of wide and overlapping ranking intervals). Ranking intervals will become
531 wider and more overlapping the more performance indicators are used (compared to the
532 number of organisations) and, at the same time, the weaker the correlation between these
533 indicators (i.e. the less information good or poor performance on one indicator provides
534 about relative performance on other indicators). The number of indicators and the
535 appropriate degree of correlation will depend on the purpose of the analysis. Wide and

536 overlapping ranking intervals do not indicate that REA is not applicable. For policy-makers
537 and managers, a key strength of REA is that wide and overlapping intervals visualize in a
538 transparent way the existing uncertainty.

539
540 Evidence of uncertainty reinforces the need to use the results as signals for further
541 analysis, rather than for definitive judgments. Since weakly correlated indicators will make
542 rankings more sensitive to different sets of weights (Foster et al., 2012), the careful use of
543 weight restrictions becomes particularly important. Weight restrictions will tend to clarify
544 the results and make explicit the impact of subjective choices about the relative value of
545 different quality indicators on performance rankings.

546
547 Dominance relations that are based on pairwise comparisons between Boards provide
548 comparative performance assessments one can be confident about. Since dominance
549 relations indicate that some DMU k performs at least as well as some other DMU l for all
550 feasible weights and there exist some weights for which it performs strictly better, this
551 information could, for instance, be used for setting performance targets across all
552 indicators included in the analysis. Since improvements on some indicators may require
553 less effort than others, indicator-specific improvements would also be informative.
554 However, this would require a different approach. Gouveia et al. (2015), for instance,
555 employ slack-variables (which define the variable-specific distance to the efficient frontier)
556 to estimate the improvements required for a DMU to reach the best performing
557 organisation. However, this approach does not indicate the improvements needed to reach
558 some specific, non-efficient DMU as it is possible with our approach. This is particularly

559 relevant for policy and management and a strength of our study, since the top performing
560 organisation may not always be the most meaningful (and practically feasible) benchmark
561 for worse performing organisations. In a collegiate rather than competitive environment,
562 such results could help organisations to learn from better performing (dominating) peers.

563
564 For a large number of organisations (and dominance relations), the clear presentation and
565 communication of results to decision-makers becomes even more important. To simplify
566 the dominance graph, DMUs which perform similarly can be grouped together (as with
567 DMUs *D* and *M* in Figure 4). A large number of dominance relations can also be visualized
568 using a matrix (see Table 3) which shows both the dominance relations and the magnitude
569 of dominance.

570
571 Finally, it is essential to re-emphasize the importance of the other methodological choices
572 (listed in section 2) that must be made when constructing a composite indicator; in
573 particular, the initial selection of indicators and risk adjustment for environmental
574 (uncontrollable) determinants of performance. If important indicators are omitted or
575 irrelevant variables are included, then performance evaluations will be meaningless
576 (Smith, 1997). The choice of performance metrics therefore needs to reflect a country's
577 definition of valued outcomes of the health service (Dowd et al., 2014).

578
579 Concerning risk adjustment, in Scotland the funding formula is designed to enable all NHS
580 Boards to produce equal levels of performance. Since this formula takes account of
581 differences in population and local characteristics (e.g. rurality), in this study we have

582 followed the argument that risk adjustment has been implemented via the funding system
583 (Jacobs et al., 2006). However, the degree to which this argument holds depends on the
584 accuracy and comprehensiveness of the formula. While for our study the direction of any
585 potential bias is difficult to determine, it is possible that inadequate risk adjustment has
586 affected observed Board performance on the constituent indicators.

587

588 As Smith (2003) notes, formula funding is fraught with challenges, such as that
589 performance criteria have proved hard to include in the formula. This means that poor
590 quality of care which increases levels of morbidity might be 'rewarded' with higher levels
591 of funding. As a result, the link between resource allocation and performance measurement
592 remains complex and an important avenue for future research.

593

REFERENCES

- 595 ALLEN, R., ATHANASSOPOULOS, A., DYSON, R. G. & THANASSOULIS, E. 1997. Weights restrictions and value
596 judgements in Data Envelopment Analysis: Evolution, development and future directions. *Annals of*
597 *Operations Research*, 73, 13-34.
- 598 APPLEBY, J. & MULLIGAN, J. 2000. *How well is the NHS performing? A composite performance indicator based*
599 *on public consultation*, London, The King's Fund.
- 600 BANKER, R. D., CONRAD, R. F. & STRAUSS, R. P. 1986. A Comparative Application of Data Envelopment
601 Analysis and Translog Methods - an Illustrative Study of Hospital Production. *Management Science*,
602 32, 30-44.
- 603 BEVAN, G. & HAMBLIN, R. 2009. Hitting and missing targets by ambulance services for emergency calls:
604 Effects of different systems of performance measurement within the UK. *Journal of the Royal*
605 *Statistical Society. Series A*, 172, 161-190.
- 606 CARINCI, F., VAN GOOL, K., MAINZ, J., VEILLARD, J., PICHORA, E. C., JANUEL, J. M., ARISPE, I., KIM, S. M. &
607 KLAZINGA, N. S. O. B. O. T. O. H. C. Q. I. E. G. 2015. Towards actionable international comparisons of
608 health system performance: expert revision of the OECD framework and quality indicators.
609 *International Journal for Quality in Health Care*, 27, 137-146.
- 610 CHERCHYE, L., MOESEN, W., ROGGE, N. & VAN PUYENBROECK, T. 2007. An introduction to 'benefit of the
611 doubt' composite indicators. *Social Indicators Research*, 82, 111-145.
- 612 CMS 2009. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration: Fact
613 sheet.
614 <http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQualityInits/downloads/HospitalPremierFactSheet200907.pdf> [9
615 May 2014].
- 616 DECANCO, K. & LUGO, M. A. 2012. Weights in multidimensional indices of wellbeing: An overview.
617 *Econometric Reviews*, 32, 7-34.
- 618 DOLAN, P. 1997. Valuing health states: A comparison of methods. *Journal of Health Economics*, 16, 617-617.
- 619 DOWD, B., SWENSON, T., KANE, R., PARASHURAM, S. & COULAM, R. 2014. CAN DATA ENVELOPMENT
620 ANALYSIS PROVIDE A SCALAR INDEX OF 'VALUE'? *Health Economics*, 23, 1465-1480.
- 621 FOSTER, J. & SEN, A. 1997. *On Economic Inequality*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- 622 FOSTER, J. E., MCGILLIVRAY, M. & SETH, S. 2012. Composite Indices: Rank Robustness, Statistical Association,
623 and Redundancy. *Econometric Reviews*, 32, 35-56.
- 624 GODDARD, M. & JACOBS, R. 2009. Using composite indicators to measure performance in health care. In:
625 SMITH, P., MOSSIALOS, E., PAPANICOLAS, I. & LEATHERMAN, S. (eds.) *Performance measurement for*
626 *health system improvement: experiences, challenges and prospects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University
627 Press, pp. 339-368.
- 628 GOUVEIA, M., DIAS, L., ANTUNES, C., MOTA, M., DUARATE, E. & TENREIRO, E. 2015. An application of value-
629 based DEA to identify the best practices in primary health care. *OR Spectrum*. DOI 10.1007/s00291-
630 015-0407-x.
- 631 GUILLEN, Ú., DEMAURO, S., MA, L., ZUPANCIC, J., WANG, E., GAFNI, A. & KIRPALANI, H. 2011. Survival rates in
632 extremely low birthweight infants depend on the denominator: avoiding potential for bias by
633 specifying denominators. *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 205, 329.e1-329.e7.
- 634 HAUCK, K. & STREET, A. 2006. Performance assessment in the context of multiple objectives: a multivariate
635 multilevel analysis. *Journal of Health Economics*, 25, 1029-48.
- 636 HEALTHCARE COMMISSION 2005. *2005 performance ratings*, London, Healthcare Commission.
- 637 HEALTH PROTECTION SCOTLAND 2007. Annual report on the surveillance of Clostridium difficile associated
638 disease (CDAD) in Scotland, Glasgow, Health Protection Scotland.
- 639 HEALTH PROTECTION SCOTLAND 2014. *Healthcare Associated Infection Annual Report 2013*, Glasgow, Health
640 Protection Scotland.
- 641 HOLLINGSWORTH, B. & STREET, A. 2006. The market for efficiency analysis of health care organisations.
642 *Health Economics*, 15, 1055-1059.

643 HUME, D. (1739). *A Treatise of Human Nature*. London: John Noon.

644 HUSSEY, P. S., DE VRIES, H., ROMLEY, J., WANG, M. C., CHEN, S. S., SHEKELLE, P. G. & MCGLYNN, E. A. 2009. A
645 systematic review of health care efficiency measures. *Health Services Research*, 44, 784-805.

646 ISD SCOTLAND 2010. Resource allocation. <http://www.isdscotland.org/Health-Topics/Finance/Resource->
647 [Allocation-Formula/information.asp](http://www.isdscotland.org/Health-Topics/Finance/Resource-) [11 November 2014].

648 JACOBS, R., GODDARD, M. & SMITH, P. 2005. How robust are hospital ranks based on composite performance
649 measures? *Medical Care*, 43, 1177-84.

650 JACOBS, R., SMITH, P. & STREET, A. 2006. *Measuring efficiency in health care: analytic techniques and health*
651 *policy*, Cambridge University Press.

652 MARLOW, A. 1995. Potential years of life lost: what is the denominator? *Journal of Epidemiology & Community*
653 *Health*, 49, 320-2.

654 MCKIBBEN, L., HORAN, T., TOKARS, J. I., FOWLER, G., CARDO, D. M., PEARSON, M. L., BRENNAN, P. J. & THE
655 HEALTHCARE INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES ADVISORY, C. 2005. Guidance on Public Reporting
656 of Healthcare-Associated Infections: Recommendations of the Healthcare Infection Control Practices
657 Advisory Committee. *American Journal of Infection Control*, 33, 217-226.

658 NAESSENS, J. M. & HUSCHKA, T. R. 2004. Distinguishing hospital complications of care from pre-existing
659 conditions. *International Journal for Quality in Health Care*, 16, I27-I35.

660 NAVARRO, V. 2000. Assessment of the world health report 2000. *Lancet*, 356, 1598-1601.

661 NHS ENGLAND 2015. *Revised Never Events Policy and Framework*, London, NHS England.

662 OECD 2008. *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators*, Paris, OECD.

663 OSBERG, L. & SHARPE, A. 2002. An index of economic well-being for selected OECD countries. *Review of*
664 *Income and Wealth*, 48, 291-316.

665 PEDRAJA-CHAPARRO, F., SALINAS-JIMENEZ, J. & SMITH, P. 1997. On the Role of Weight Restrictions in Data
666 Envelopment Analysis. *Journal of Productivity Analysis*, 8, 215-230.

667 REEVES, D., CAMPBELL, S. M., ADAMS, J., SHEKELLE, P. G., KONTOPANTELLIS, E. & ROLAND, M. O. 2007.
668 Combining multiple indicators of clinical quality: an evaluation of different analytic approaches.
669 *Medical Care*, 45, 489-96.

670 ROMANO, P., HUSSEY, P. & RITLEY, D. 2010. *Selecting Quality and Resource Use Measures: A Decision Guide for*
671 *Community Quality Collaboratives*, Rockville, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.

672 SALO, A. & PUNKKA, A. 2011. Ranking intervals and dominance relations for ratio-based efficiency analysis.
673 *Management Science*, 57, 200-214.

674 SALTELLI, A., RATTO, M., ANDRES, T., CAMPOLONGO, F., CARIBONI, J., GATELLI, D., SAISANA, M. &
675 TARANTOLA 2008. *Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer*, Wiley E-book.

676 SCHLAUD, M., BRENNER, M. H., HOOPMANN, M. & SCHWARTZ, F. W. 1998. Approaches to the denominator in
677 practice-based epidemiology: a critical overview. *Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health*, 52,
678 13S-19S.

679 SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT 2014. NHS Boards. <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Health/NHS->
680 [Workforce/NHS-Boards](http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Health/NHS-) [14 May 2014].

681 SMITH, P. 1997. Model misspecification in data envelopment analysis. *Annals of Operations Research*, 73, 233-
682 252.

683 SMITH, P. 2002. Developing composite indicators for assessing health system efficiency. In: SMITH, P. (ed.)
684 *Measuring up: improving health system performance in OECD countries*. Paris: OECD, pp. 295-318.

685 SMITH, P. C. 2003. Formula funding of public services: An economic analysis. *Oxford Review of Economic*
686 *Policy*, 19, 301-322.

687 WHO 2000. *The world health report 2000 - Health systems: improving performance*, Geneva, World Health
688 Organization.

689 ZHAN, C. L., ELIXHAUSER, A., FRIEDMAN, B., HOUCHEMS, R. & CHIANG, Y. P. 2007. Modifying DRG-PPS to
690 include only diagnoses present on admission - Financial implications and challenges. *Medical Care*,
691 45, 288-291.

692 ZHOU, P., ANG, B. W. & ZHOU, D. Q. 2010. Weighting and aggregation in composite indicator construction: A
693 multiplicative optimization approach. *Social Indicators Research*, 96, 169-181.

694 **TABLES AND FIGURES**

695 **Table 1 Variables and descriptive statistics**

	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Data for part I: robustness to choices of weights and dominance relations					
18WRTT ^a	Number of patient journeys from referral to treatment over 18 weeks (among patients seen) per 100,000 RTT patient journeys from referral to treatment (among patients seen)	7,361	3,475	2,209	15,123
4-hour A&E waiting ^a	Number of recorded A&E waits lasting over 4 hours per 100,000 A&E attendances	4,739	3,090	730	9,172
Emergency admissions ^a	Number of emergency admissions among +75 years per 100,000 population	2,887	424	2,239	3,646
MRSA/MSSA ^a	Number of MRSA/MSSA infections per 100,000 population	23	10	4	36
C.difficile ^a	Number of Clostridium difficile infections per 100,000 population	44	28	14	123
Delayed discharges ^a	Number of bed days lost due to delayed discharges per 100,000 occupied bed days	29	18	6	69
Data for part II: robustness to choices of denominator					
Quality indicators (numerator variables)					
C.difficile ^a	Number of Clostridium difficile infections	133	123	8	399
MRSA/MSSA ^a	Number of MRSA/MSSA infections	108	114	1	413
Population indicators (denominator variables)					
Total population ^b	Resident population (mid-year estimates)	475,232	318,214	113,880	1,214,587
OBD ^a	Number of occupied bed days	113,244	98,182	20,723	365,951

696 Sources: ^aHEAT target system; ^bNational Records of Scotland. All data are for 2012/13.

697

698 **Table 2 Comparative performance of Boards on the constituent six quality**
 699 **indicators, based on rates as shown in Table 1, part I**

		18WRTT	4-hour A&E waiting	Emergency admissions	MRSA/MSSA	C.difficile	Delayed discharges
A	Ayrshire & Arran	8,691	8,312	3,646	23	49	14
B	Borders	6,204	3,267	3,612	21	44	10
C	Dumfries & Galloway	6,170	5,987	3,130	27	36	29
D	Fife	6,899	4,559	2,725	35	26	69
E	Forth Valley	15,123	8,238	2,513	26	14	50
F	Grampian	9,343	3,812	2,239	25	24	43
G	Greater Glasgow & Clyde	8,523	6,956	3,061	34	33	17
H	Highland	5,817	2,199	2,825	17	24	45
I	Lanarkshire	5,551	8,667	2,671	24	35	24
J	Lothian	12,293	9,172	2,495	30	42	43
K	Orkney	2,649	1,663	2,661	9	84	6
L	Shetland	2,209	730	2,555	13	34	14
M	Tayside	8,701	1,119	2,964	36	50	21
N	Western Isles	4,876	1,666	3,320	4	123	21

700

701

702 **Table 3 Comparative scope for improvement needed to reach another target or**
 703 **reference Board in Scotland**

Dominated Board	Target or Reference Board													
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
Ayrshire & Arran	A	8 %				2 %		25 %	2 %		22 %	36 %		2 %
Borders	B							9 %			14 %	27 %		
Dumfries & Galloway	C	<1 %				7 %		21 %			15 %	31 %		
Fife	D	3 %				11 %		24 %			17 %	32 %		
Forth Valley	E					7 %		12 %			3 %	21 %		
Grampian	F							6 %				15 %		
Greater Glasgow & Clyde	G	9 %	8 %			16 %		29 %	11 %		22 %	36 %		2 %
Highland	H												10 %	
Lanarkshire	I							12 %			6 %	23 %		
Lothian	J	4 %	2 %		6 %	18 %		23 %	11 %		18 %	33 %		
Orkney	K													
Shetland	L													
Tayside	M	8 %				4 %		20 %			25 %	36 %		
Western Isles	N													

704

705


706 **Table 4 Performance on healthcare-associated infections relative to different choices of denominator**

Board	Per 100,000 OBDs		Per 100,000 population		Per 100,000 OBDs		Per 100,000 population		Ranking interval for composite performance on MRSA/MSSA and C.difficile relative to OBDs and population
	Number of MRSA/MSSA	Rank	Number of MRSA/MSSA	Rank difference compared to OBDs	Number of C.difficile	Rank	Number of C.difficile	Rank difference compared to OBDs	
Shetland	21	3	13	0	55	1	34	-5	1-3
Highland	87	4	17	0	124	6	24	+3	1-4
Forth Valley	148	13	26	+4	78	2	14	+1	1-10
Orkney	13	2	9	0	114	5	84	-8	2-13
Western Isles	4	1	4	0	140	7	123	-7	2-14
Grampian	108	6	25	-2	105	3	24	+1	4-6
Lanarkshire	113	8	24	+1	162	10	35	+3	5-8
Borders	116	9	21	+4	241	14	44	+4	5-14
Dumfries & Galloway	117	10	27	0	161	9	36	+1	6-10
Greater Glasgow & Clyde	113	7	34	-5	109	4	33	-1	6-13
Fife	211	14	35	+1	155	8	26	+4	6-14
Ayrshire & Arran	99	5	23	-1	211	13	49	+2	7-13
Lothian	127	11	30	0	177	11	42	+2	10-13
Tayside	141	12	36	-2	195	12	50	0	12-14

707


708

709 **Figure 1 Performance rankings for all feasible weights**




710

711 **Figure 2 Performance rankings with ordinal weight restrictions**



712


713 **Figure 3 Performance rankings with ordinal and proportional weight restrictions**



714

715

716 **Figure 4 Dominance graph for Scottish Health Boards, based on ordinal and**
717 **proportional weight restrictions**



718